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"\ literature study investigating the role of communication within the Bretton 
\'\'oods School of Development Communication as an agent to achieve social and 
economical change in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study presents social and economic 
change as intended outcomes of modernisation as supported by this school of thought. It 
grapples with \X'estern modernisation discourse that was advanced by Bretton Woods 
institutions as well as the instruments of communication (media) applied to achie\'e the 
intended de\-elopmental outcomes. It suggests that the presumed lack of modernisation in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is based on subjecti\'e de\'elopment criteria and the applicability of 
ineffecti\-e communication and governance methods that failed to consider the region's 
cultural and socio-economic diversity. In a postmodern world, the study suggests that 
there should be a gradual move away from the Bretton \X'oods School of De\'elopment 
Communication-thought and that the focus should rather be to enable the region to 
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The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the role of communication in 
achie\'ing the goals of modernisation. It does this by investigating the priority 
gi\'en communication by the Bretton \'{'oods School of De\'elopment 
Communication, a school based on liberalist principles that has direct ties to the 
Bretton \'{'oods Conference held in 1944. During this conference, the 
foundations were laid for a movement towards a global economic order that 
called for an international mmT for undewloped societies (termed traditional 
societies) to achieve the socio-economic, political and infrasttuctural changes to 
assist them to operate in, and become, a modern, industrialised society. 
This suggested eradication of traditional SOCletleS was termed 
"modemiJatio17." The Bretton Woods School of Development Communication, 
informed by theorists Lerner, Lipset, Rogers, Schramm, E\'erett and Rugels, 
argued that communication methods could assist in achie\'ing modernisation by 
ad\'ancing the goals of this paradigm. Theories adnnced by these researchers all 
relied on the power of communication to assist in de\'elopment. It was argued 
that through the dissemination of modernisation discourse a society would adopt 
modernisation innovations that would place them in line with the socio-
economic and political development of wealthier countries; where within this 
paradigm political development is viewed as the ad\'ancement of democratic 
governance systems. 
In short, in order to achieve modernisation, traditional governance 
methods and socia-economic structures were scrutinised and it was concluded 
that the media could play an active role in ha\'ing unde\'cloped nations adopt the 
will to achieve democracy and m'erall social upliftment. 
Therefore, the Bretton Woods School of Development Communication acts as 
an agent of modernisation by prioritising communication in the stages of 
dewlopment. By looking at modernisation, its associated goals of socio-economic 
and political dewlopment as well as the communication structures applied in 











of de\'elopment communication by highlighting general assumptions and critique 
associated with the theme. It is assumed that modernisation paradigms did not deliver 
the expected results in Sub-Saharan Africa and that the reason for this is the 
presupposed fact that Sub-Saharan Africa does not have the infrastructures needed to 
support the advancement of media technologies and therefore, its accompanying 
influences of socio-economic and political de\'elopment. 
It is postulated that international communication policies were too readily applied 
to developing nations without necessary 'doJJJeJticatioll proceJJeJ' that would ha\T 
adjusted the modernisation paradigms (and its accompanying communication 
systems) to make them more applicable to de\Tloping countries. 
Firstly, the argument is approached by examining international theories of 
modernisation - supported by the Bretton Woods School of Development 
Communication - and the prioritisation of communication within this context. 
The Bretton Woods School of Development Communication is informed by 
theorists Lerner, Lipset, Rogers, Schramm, Ewrett and Rugcls who argued in fa\'our 
of the integrati\'e and interacti\'e capabilities of the media, and in turn postulated that 
modernisation could be achieved with the dissemination of modernisation discourse 
via communication systems - mass media - that would lead to traditional societies 
adopting the innm'ations of modern, capitalist societies. 
Within this realm political de\'elopment referred to wider political participation 
and the general ad\'ancement of democratic govcrnance systems. 
The Bretton \v'oods School of De\Tlopment Communication is thus an overall 
westerniscd approach to achieving de\'clopment in 1\frica - from the methods of 
message dissemination to the message content. All theories supporting this School 
are aimed at achieving socio-economic and political structures that are \'Vestern in 
character - and arguably aimed at maintaining the hegemonic status of the United 
Statcs (US) through structures with ties to the Bretton Woods Conference like the 
\Vorld Bank and IMF. 
Secondly, African realities that challenge the successful transmISSIon of 












If communication had to aSsIst In achic\'ing ccrtaln socio-economic 
dC\'elopment goals, thcn, in light of United Nations Human Deyelopment 
Report on Democracy (HDR 2002) and other aggregatc data on indiyidual 
countries within the Sub-Saharan region, one has to ask why the theoretical 
approach of Brctton Woods School of Dcyelopment Communication - using 
the media to assist in the diffusion and adoption of the \'alues, principles, and 
models that ensured socio-economic adyancement in wcalthier countries - did 
not deliyer the expected results in this region. 
In order to gain a holistic \'iew on the subject matter, one has to pay 
attention to the paradigms that characterise the field of de\'elopment 
communication. (\\1here paradigm in this context denotes "a set of practical 
theoretical beliefs that a.rsist lIS in interpreting the u)orld around lfJ, and shapeJ the practical 
app/ieatiom in the Jtmp/!/e toulard bettemJent" [Guba 1990 in I\Iefalopulos 2008: 441). 
Therefore, in ordcr to address the research aim onc has to address the 
underlying concepts, applications and oycrlapping boundaries that sustain thc 
Bretton Woods School of Deyelopment Communication. (See: Illustration 1) 
Deyelopment goals are presented as being within a triangular relationship wherc 
communication, dcyclopment and gm'ernance operatc within an influential sphere 
- i.e. changes in one was shown to ha\'e an effect on the other. This was 
substc1.ntiated at the hand of yarious theorists, notably Lcrner, upset, Rogers and 
Schramm who, during rcscarch, illustrated the in flucntial relationship bctwecn 
cffccti\'c communication and deyclopment on the one hand and democracy on 
thc othcr. These theorists and thcories informed the Bretton \\1oods School of 
De\'elopment Communication who applied this research in modcrnisation efforts 
aiming at decrcasing the gap between traditional and industrial societies. 
It is important to illustrate what modernisation sct out to achie\'e; the 
general resistance it rcceived from Sub-Saharan countries; and how and why 
communication methods failed to assist modcrnisation as em~saged by the 
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11lC Bretton \X'oods School of Development Communication is infonned by leading theorists Rogers, 
Schranun and Lerner, who published major works on communication assisting modernisation; specifically 
\\~thin socio-economic and politjcal development spheres, where political dC\'elopment is \'iewed in the 
liberalist perspecti\'e as the ad\'ancement of democratic principles. ll1ese theories were applied to Sub-
Saharan .\frica (a traditional society) by the School \-ia Bretton \X'oods' institutions such as the World Bank 
(\X13) and International Monetary Fund (l:\!r) in order to achie\'C modernisation in the region. HO\\'C\'er, the 
region showed a general resistance to modernisation paradit,'1ns - illustrated at the hand of current socio-
economic realities. ll1erefore, it is sU~2;ested that there should be a mO\'C to aehin'C a regional solurjon that 
is nlorc '_\frican' in character. 
Following this, it is important to understand the O\-erarching concepts. 
These are: communication as a tool 1ll the dissemination of \\lestern 
modernisation discourse and modernisation as an ideal that incorporates sooo-
econOl111C and political development goals based on a doctrine of liberalism and 
the adoption of democratic systems characterised by wider political participation. 













" Mass Medii 
ll:,,', " , 
rr 1 I I 
, DMOprl'lent: Governance: ' 
emnoloSical & Economical Political & OJltural 
, " 
"" , 
11,e mass media acts as an wllbrclla intluencing both tcchnological and economical dc\-c1opmcnt, as \\-cll as 
effecting changes in gm'ernment, 
RESEARCH LIMlT~\TlONS 
Since a literature study can, at best, only summarise and organise existing 
scholarship, it will not produce new, empirical insights. It can howe\-er highlight 
arguments and make suggestions for future studics on a more adyanced lcycl of 
study e.g. doctorate degrec. Bccause this rc\-icw forms part of a ~lasters' mini-
dissertation, timcframe and word count makcs it impossible for this study to 
trcat all issues with the same level of depth. Therefore, this study should be 
treated as an introduction to the field of dc\-c!opmcnt communication as 
undcrstood and forwarded under the auspices of the Bretton \V'oods School of 
Dcyelopment Communication, rather than an all-encompassing work. 
In reyiewing thc articlcs, it bccamc clear that this field of study has an 
array of intcrlinking subfields that substantiatc some of the arguments touch cd 
upon in this work - the New World Information and Conununication Ordcr 
(N\\1CO) being a prime example. Howe\-er, within the realms of thc Bretton 
\'\'oods School of Deyclopment Communication, thc rc\-iew was limited to 
studying thc paradigms that characterise this particular school of dC\-c!opmcnt 
communication and to study its influence on Sub-Saharan },frica. 
,\s a result, the N\V'ICO, a radical mmT by ,\frican countries to address 
mattcrs relating to the imbalanced intcrnational flow of news, as wcll as uncgual 
distribution of media structures, and unequal acccss to information (a key area of 
concern) does not rccciyc in dcpth cm-erage. The N\\1CO and resulting 











modernisation paradigm that seeks a mO\~ement away from traditional societies 
(also lesser developed countries or LCD's) towards urban, capital-dri\Ten, 
de\~eloped societies. This goal is reflected in communication theories that 
support the Bretton Woods School of Development Communication - also in 
the libertarian theory of the press, the main press (i.e. communication) model 
that is \videly used in many countries. 1 
Daniel Lerner (1957 cited in \X,'inham 1970:811) for example, highlighted 
the importance of literacy and urbanisation in development. He indicated how 
the relationship between certain socio-economic \"ariables such as urbanisation, 
education and communication influences political processes. This relationship 
was tested and supported by Lipset (1959 cited in Winham 1970:811). Lerner 
further de\~eloped the role of communication in de\Tlopment by conducting a 
study on a traditional village where he found inhabitants were readily exchanging 
the security and rigidity of traditional culture for the "/filceJ1aint)' and 0ppOJ1unity of 
tbe IJmltietb century industrial age" (cited in Hyden et al 2002:3). In addition, 
Wilbur Schramm published a preparatory work for UNESCO called Mass Media 
and National Development, in which the dismal state of communication in 
~\frica was noted, but nevertheless emphasised the potential of communication 
to make a difference in agricultural development and health care. 
"\11 these changes, or influences, were essentially based on diffusions of 
innovation-theory, which emphasises the power of communication effects. 
Communication, it was postulated, could support modernisation by creating 
media messages that sustain and enhance knowledge of new practices, whilst 
persuading the audience to adopt external innovations linked to development. 
This theory was developed by E.M. Rogers (1962). 
However, later studies done by these theorists confIrmed that the mO\Te 
towards modernisation and accompanying goals was being hampered by socio-
economic factors within traditional societies not pre\~iously taken into account. 
111erefore, in light of scrutinising \IV' estern modernisation discourse from a 
de\Teloping nation's perspective the theoretical approach that is followed is two-
I To expand on this a short chapter on the four theories of the press is presented that illusuate that. \frica, in 












fold. 1\ de\'elopmental state perspectiye analyses how modernisation theories were 
implemented during key transformations in the international realm ~ most notably 
towards the end of the Cold War (1989 ~ 1991), and during the expansion of US 
ideals and ambitions after World War II. \Xnereas cultural regionalism calls for the 
de\'elopment of regional structures and institutions, and in light of the post-cold 
war era, hints at the role of societies in ha\-ing to construct their own identity that 
has pre\'iously been ignored by Western paradigms such as modernisation. Looking 
at territorial, rather than global solutions is suggested. 
In scrutinising modernisation paradigms, the argument also relies on 
dependency theory, which argues that the periphery, or Third World, was 
unde\-eloped and, to a large extent undermined by acti\'ities that only benefited 
capital societies. More than making countries dependent on capital societies, by 
imposing political ideals (democracy) and socio-economic goals modernisation 
has also been cultiyating a dependence of Third \X'orld nations on the cultures 
and accepted forms of governance of the \V'est, resulting in not only economical, 
but cultural and political dependency as well. 
Although the notion of modernisation is criticised, is not the goal to reject 
modernisation in its entirety. It is argued that the manner in which it was applied 
to de\'eloping countries was defecti\'e and that the paradigm should reconsider 
goals that are in line with cultural, economic and political realities ~ therefore, 
democracy as an accepted form of gmTrnance is ctiticised. 
Realising this, it is also accepted that within a global network, no nation 
can function without some or other form of relation with another. International 
goals and imposition is a reality of the global realm. Therefore, modernisation 
cannot be rejected ~ what is argued is the fact that the communication methods 
that haye been applied to forward this paradigm has not been domesticated, and 
perhaps are in need of reconsideration. 
It is not the goal of this dissertation to prm-ide these domestication 
methods. It is the goal of this dissertation to act as a precursor to a field of study 












An extenSl\-e literature study proyides the structure to this dissertation and 
exanunes the prioritisation of communications in the uni\-ersal application of 
modernisation paradigms, as informed by Bretton \\/oods' institutions. 
In order to fully understand the concepts of modernisation and 
communication, which are the focus of this dissertation, the underlying concepts that 
join them together, namely development and gO\-ernance, ha\-e to be understood. 
The O\-erarching concepts of this dissertation are thus: modernisation, 
de\-elopment, communication and governance. 
As stated supra, the issues relating to this dissertation are complex and 
intricately interlinked. The definition and boundaries of these overlapping 
interdisciplinary areas cannot be separated from one another. Authors haw noted 
that ongoing changes and transformations in the international realm, such as the 
polarization along ethnic, religious and national lines, have increased trans-
nationalisation, as well as increased information flow and influence. A growing 
consciousness of marginalised groups and diminished resources, ha\-e all added to 
the complexity of this subject (Melkote 2003:130). 
Communication is defined as the transportation of messages, ideals, YleWS, 
whether of the populace or government in broadcast or print.2 Development includes 
the priority of communication that refers to the de\-elopment of communication 
systems; whether existing or new, the dewlopment of systems that teach people how to 
correctly decipher messages, and socio-economic de\-elopment that would enable 
people to access messages. These messages could ha\-e \-arious goals, but in 
modernisation theory, as supported by the Bretton \v'oods School of De\-clopment 
Communication, it meant the dissemination of information with one goal namely to 
achie\-e modernisation or to stimulate the will for modernisation. In other words, 
development communication has one goal: to promote social de\-elopment. 
Throughout modernisation remains the interlinking theme, since this paradigm 
introduced historical and conceptual biases to de\-elopment communication that are 
still prominent today. For the conceptualisation of these O\-erarching concepts, this 
dissertation relies greatly on Melkote's (2003:130) systematic definition: ,\fodemiJtltion 











is based 011 neoclassical economic theory, JJ/hich supp011ed capitalistic economic dez'eiopment. Tbis 
perspectil,e a.Llumes the Western model of economic gro1J/lh, del'eloped dUlin,g tbe BrettoJ] Woodr 
Conference, to be tbe ultimate goal and that tbe method to aciJiel'c this, is lJ)' a transition from 
traditional ideas and practices towards modem, ttrbanired practices. 
To critique this assumption, this dissertation challenges the influence of 
modernisation and the impact of cultural expansionism on deYcloping, but overtly 
traditional, societies. 
Deyelopment is not ,'iewed as separate from modernisation. Rogers (1976 cited 
in ~Ioemeka 1994: 1 0-11) defIned dcyclopment as "a n,ide!y paJ1iripato~)' proms of social 
chall)!,e and matoial adzJancement (including greater equalit)" freedom and otber l'altled qualities) 
for the lJiq!01i!J' qf tbe people through tbeir gaining greater control Ol'er tbeir e!ll'ironment. JJ It is 
an outflow of modernisation, and is subjected to similar critique. 
The oyerarching concept of governance is approached from tl1e perspecti,-e of 
liberation, which emphasises frecdom in all aspects of society, whemer personal or 
communal. Once again, a critical approach to mis ,-jew is followed, and me 
dominance of \X/estern constructed forms of goyernance, e.g. democracy, is 
challenged and it is argued mat a reappraisal of democracy is needed if equity is not to 
be replaced by development. In line with me research aims me presentation of 
\\'estern models of democracy in communication meory (notably me libertarian and 
social responsibility meory of the press) is challcnged. 
Finally, communication is presented as me binding concept that links me 
abm-e-mentioned concepts wim one another. This dissertation illustrates mat 
communication was awarded a certain degree of prioritisation in all these paradigms. 
In addition to other definitions of communication presented supra, which 
defInes it as all forms of communication, whether broadcast or print media, 
emphasis is placed on thc importance of traditional forms of communication, 
such as the oral transmissions within Third \\'orld countries since communication 











INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM ST"\ TEl\fENT 
During 1944, shortly before the end of the Second \X'orld War, forty-four 
countries met with the common goal of restructuring the world economy. At a 
com-ention that later became known as the BRETTO~ \'VOODS CO:-':FEREl"CE, the 
foundations were laid for a global shift towards one economic order. 
In order to achieye this worldwide shift, members realised that drastic 
measures had to be taken if all countries were to be included in the economic 
restructuring programme. This was reflected in the summary of the conference 
agreements: "It iJ in the intereJt of allnatioJZJ that pOJt-war reCOllJ/mc/ioll .rhould be rapid 
Likeu1.re, tbe delJelopment ~f the reJourceJ of pal1ictllar regioJZJ iJ in tbe ,~eJleral ecollomic illtereJt. 
Pr({gralJlJ of recomtmclion and det'elopmen/ will .rpeed economic pmgreJJ el'co'where, 1~1I1 aid 
political Jtabzii(J' and joJter peace" (Bretton Woods Conference 1944). 
These progranunes were to be executed by three mighty global institutions 
that were established during the conference: the World Bank (WE), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMI~ and the International Trade Organisation 
(ITO), who in turn gaye birth to other global institutions, which supported the 
common goal of one economic order, as em-isaged during the conference. 
It was realised that one of the fIrst steps to achie\-e reconstruction was to 
bring all countries to more or less the same lc\TI of de\-elopment, since a certain 
leyel of ad\-ancement meant that the necessary infrastructures were in place to 
support economic markets and global initiatiws expressed during the conyention. 
~\ massi\-e effort to "cleame" the world of "backu'ard" infrastructures ensued. 
In an attempt to mO\-e away from rural societies towards urbanised deYeloped 
societies, programmes were put in place in order to achie\-e what became known 
as modernisation. These efforts were also applied to Africa.) 
Although efforts to achie\-e modernisation took on yanous forms, 
conununication methods as agents of change remained the key area of support 
within the Bretton Woods School of De\-elopment Communication. This support 
was infonned by studies advocating a causal relationship between communication 
and socio-economic change. Within the deyelopment communication realm, these 
; _\lthough reference to Africa here is meant in a continental sense, the argumcnt of this papcr mTrall 











studies (discussed later in the dissertation) also became a backbone to Western 
modernisation discourse forwarded under the auspices of the IMF and WE. 
One component of the programmes that were aimed at achieving the 
em-isaged mm~e away from tradition towards modernity was de\"elopment 
communication. TIlls component was, in tmn, interpreted by Bretton Woods 
institutions and applied in modernisation efforts. "\s conceptThilised supra, these 
ideologies in conjunction with certain international institutions like the Il\IF and WE 
ha\T been tenned the Bretton Woods School of De\Tlopment Communication. 
Efforts to modernise the African continent are not new. Since the Second 
\'('orld \X'ar international efforts and ideals to achie\"e a shift: from the traditional to 
the modem ha\'e been packaged and repackaged under new policies and agreements 
which have all achieved marginal success. Development thinking in general has been 
criticised for being one-sided, biased, Western and generally out of touch with the 
realities of Africa. Some authors go as far as to describe African modernisation as 
merely a \X'estern 'experiment' that has gone miserably 'wrong' this blame is wholly 
justified , and indeed this dissertation does dispute the total disregard often 
expressed towards international relief efforts (Ayish 1993:487-510). 
Instead of modernisation efforts achieving the desirable outcome of 
de\'elopment, the continent has merely stagnated and, some would argue, e\Tn 
degraded. "\frica's underdevelopment and O\"erall lack of development is often 
blamed on decades of Western-prescribed deyelopment efforts. More specifically, 
this blame is sometimes aimed at international agencies such as the IMF, the WE, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 
and the United Nations Deyelopment Programme (UNDP). It can be debated 
whether this blame is wholly justified, and indeed this dissertation disputes the 
total disregard often expressed towards international relief efforts, and further 
illustrates how blame is often aimed at the Structural ~\djustment Programmes 
(S"\PS) - a brainchild of the IMF - which were applied to "\frica without the 
necessary domestication processes. TIlls is discussed in more detail injiYl under 
'African rCJiJtance to Alodemiratioll pamdigmJ. ' 
As stated the Il\fF and WE were born out of negotiations during the 
Bretton \X'oods Conference, and UNESCO, UNDP and other relief agencies had 











support and further the international \lSlOn of sustainable deyelopment geared 
towards the creation of a single economic order. 
Eycn though Bretton Woods, as an institution, was disbanded in 1971, its 
ideals, members and core institutions remained, trying to maintain rapid 
de\·elopment and a global shift from traditional to modern societies. 
Although the idea of modernisation was not initially emisaged during the 
Bretton \Voods Conference, it became an acti\"e concern as a result of it. The goals 
of modernity were informed by earlier models of de\·elopment where tradition and 
modernity were juxtaposed in an ~deal' yersus 'noll-ideal' system. Traditional 
societies were yiewed as non-ideal societies that had to be transformed to ideal, 
modern societies by moying along certain stages of growth as proposed by \VW 
Rostow (1979) . .j 
In terms of these earlier theories, traditional SOCleues were regarded as 
small, rural, collectiyist nations where interpersonal ties were strong. Modern 
societies, in contrast, were characterised as large, urban, indi\"idual-driyen 
nations where ties among members were rather impersonal. Earlier efforts to 
define modernisation saw traditional societies being compared to earlier stages 
in European development. 
These 'bipolar' theories were reflected in dC\·elopment plans of Bretton 
\X'oods institutions. Most of these theories had relations with or reflected the 
ideals of the Marshall Plan, which was also known as the Europe Recovery 
Progranune. This programme was launched by the US after World \X'ar II to 
reconstruct a war-torn Europe. This was the first, in what would become a host of 
other, goyernment-sponsored foreign assistance projects. 
The significance of the Marshall Plan for Africa should not be disregarded. 
\'Ollie it gained momentum and showed success in Europe, the US was busy 
expanding on a global scale, expanding its markets and furthering US policies and 
ideals, cushioning the world with its humanitarian assistance in the form of 
prmiding credit and loan assistance. Africa in the middle '50s was an untapped 
market, and according to the US, would haye remained untapped by world 
I Sec Rostow (1979) C;cttil"-~ FlVlJl J Jere to There, in which book he describes modernisation as a linear process 












markets if the continent did not show a le\'el of de\'elopment - at that stage ~Africa 
was generating a mere 15% of the world's income (Melkote & Steeyes 2001:51). 
In order to implement the Marshall Plan in 1\frica, a roll-out programme 
had to be structured in such a way that it would proY1de Africa, regarded as an 
income depriYCd continent, with the necessary funds to deyelop, in order for 
world markets to penetrate it. This meant that Africa had to be prm-1ded with the 
necessary funds to de\Tlop structures that would support an international ideal. 
The Bretton Woods conference established the \\'orld Bank (WB) as one of 
these structures as the key loan and credit prm-1ding agency for Third World 
countries.s The .tvi'llshall Plan was repackaged under a Four Point Programme. The 
fourth point of this programme focused on a "mill program ~f lJtode17lisation and capital 
inl'eJtllleJlt" (fruman cited in Melkote & Steeycs 2001:51). Thus, modernisation was 
designed by US/European ideas and concepts of ad\'ancement - most of them out 
of touch and focus with J\frican realities. What followed was plan upon plan, policy 
upon rehashed policy, achieving marginal successes. 
An overall deconstruction of these plans would require a book, and indeed 
many haye been written on the subject already. 
This dissertation therefore instead focuses on one section of these 
de\'elopment plans which are often underestimated or disregarded, V1Z. the 
prioritisation of communication in the stages of de\'elopment and its ongoll1g 
prioritisation in the dC\'eloped world, where communication is \-1ewed as a method 
to communicate the 'will' for deYClopment as proposed by Rogers's (1974) 
"difJu.rions Oil in12olJatiollJ." The Bretton Woods institutions paid attention to the area 
of communication and many policies to promote modernisation \-1a communication 
were put in place in accordance with the support of its yarious institutions. 
Modernisation required the dissemination of modern ideas and practices. 
In theory, changes in indi\-1duals were expected to lead to an oyerall change in 
the larger system, since individuals would seek ways to advance their needs and 
expectations for modernisation. As Whiting noted, "!leU' demalldJ and new 
opportunities make tbe traditional mien/a/ions illappropliate and, to a dCJ?,rec, r/ysjil77ctional" 
(Whiting 1971:211). 
i Together \\~th the \x'B, d,e 1MI' and Ceneral ~\grecment on Tariffs and Trade (C_\ TT) were created, 











It was envisaged that people in Third \'V' arId nanons were thus fIrst to 
acquire a thirst for modernisation in order to mobilise a mm-ement towards 
change. In practice, this emerged as one of the fIrst steps in Rostow's stages of 
de\-elopment. Communication would thus mobilise and reinforce economic 
de\Tlopment. Therefore, countries' communication policies, both internationally 
as well as nationally, had to reflect the goals of development plans in order for 
Third \XTorld nations to participate in the global economy as envisaged at the 
Bretton \'V' oods Conference. 
Ideas, theories and goals were developed to achieve the intended stages of 
modernisation and these were all captured and reflected in the Bretton Woods 
School of DeYClopment Communication. 
In order to achieve a holistic deconstruction of the ideas, theories and goals 
as set forth and developed by Bretton Woods' institutions, a sectional breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods School of Development Communication would provide 
the most appropriate structure and method for this. 
Study and research for this dissertation, re\-ealed how leading theorists' 
theories supported and/or departed from the Bretton Woods School of 
De\-e!opment Communication. nus dissertation reflects upon and illustrate these 
theories. Emphasis are placed on the leading theories that informed this school of 
thought, and it is illustrated how theories they de\!eloped, supported the ideals and 
goals of modernisation. 
Communication processes ill the Third \'V'orld and its influence on 
modernisation outcomes is one that triggers ongoing research within a modern era 
- but it is notable how new research is informed by a critique of past policies, a 
case of Hi.rt01ia e.rt A1agi.rtra Vitae." 
In a postmodern world institutions are still informed by the Bretton Woods 
conference - and even though it was disbanded in 1971, an array of institutions 
still exists today with direct ties to the Bretton \VToods conference. 
It is submitted that an independent discussion of each of these institutions is 
unnecessary, as this dissertation will clearly illustrate how Bretton \VToods' thought 
processes and its founding institutions are intet\vo\Tn within the domain of 
de\-elopment communication. 











Of greater importance to the theme of this clissertation is a breakdown of its 
related key concepts and theories. It is submitted that this will be thc most 
cffectiye way of scrutinising the institutional approach towards deyelopment 
communication and to address the problem statement associated with the theme 
which is: \X-'hat clid modernisation set out to achie\'e? \'7hat were / are the main 
antagonists challenging thc modcrnisation paracligm in Sub-Saharan Africa? If 
communication methods failed to assist modernisation as em'isagcd by the 
Bretton Woods School of Deyelopment Communication which factors imposed 
on the paracligm's successful application and what are the more effectiyc 












MODERNISATION AND THE BRETTON \'rOODS SCHOOL OF 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNIC\ TION: 
2.1 CORE INSTITUTIONS AND THE MODERNISATION IDEAL 
2.1.1 Modernisation: Alain Assumptions 
Modernisation can be viewed as one of the most influential paradigms to 
appear after World War II, in that it had enormous social, cultural and economic 
consequences for all developing nations (11elkote & Stee\~es 2001:130). 
De\-eloped into a theory in the later 1950s and early 1960s, supporters of 
modernisation envisaged metamorphoses from one system to a more adyanced 
system. In broad terms the transition implied a change from a traditional system 
to an industrialised, specialised system. Mostly focussed on socio-economic 
deyelopment, the modernisation paradigm encapsulated numerous eyolutionary 
functions or trends, based on industrialisation, urbanisation, modern education 
and the spread of the market economy (Hyden et al 2002:2). 
Huntington's construction of the modernisation concept highlights the 
impact of modernisation on the study of politics: 
'Tbe IbeoD' of modenlZ~ration YJaJ embraced by political JcimtiJtJ, and coJJlparatil)e 
politiu lVaJ looked at in tbe context ~f moderniration. Tbe conceptJ of J7lodernif)' and 
tradition bidfair to replace ma~y of the olher !Jpolo,fl,ieJ lPbicb bad been dear 10 Ibe beartJ of 
political ana/ptJ: democraC)', oligarclJ)J and dictatonbip,- liberakrlll and COl7JenJatl~flJl,' 
totalitarianiJm and cOl7JtitutionaiiJm,- JocialiJJ7l, comtJllmiJlll, a1ld capitaliJm,- nationaiiJm 
and intemationaliJJtl" (Huntington 1971 :285). 
Modernisation emerged as the paradigm that would juxtapose social 
realities against one another. 'Adl'al1ced' was intended to replace 'prillJitiz'e'in all 
spheres. Society was viewed as a 'peiforated' system that would collect all the 
constructi\~e particles of change - in this case, tl1e process of increased social 
differentiation, integration and adaptation - e\~entually to ~fl,roJJ;' into an 
industrialised, modern society. Modernisation, thus, from its beginning stages, 
was based upon certain stages of development as if it was some form of ,\BC 
that could be applied to all countries eyerywhere. 
Tradition became the foundation that had to be replaced in order to wipe 











for example, argued that developed countries exhibited higher lewis of 
universalism, achievement orientation, and functional specificity, whilst the 
underdeveloped socletles of Africa were characterised by particularism, 
ascription, and functional diffuseness. He argued that, in essence, cultural 
eradication was necessary in order to successfully transform into a modern state 
and to achie\'e economic growth (Abrok-waa 1999:649). 
\,(W Rostow (1971) provided perhaps one of the most linear approaches to 
modernisation. He argued that modernisation was related to stages of 
deyelopment. He identified fi\'e stages that would sen'e as rites of passage to 
modernisation: 
• traditional Jociet)'; 
• preconditionJfor take~ff; 
• takeoff; 
• tbe drille to matllnty; 
• and tbe age ~rmaJJ coJ1JumptioJl. 
During each of these stages a society - grmvmg from a traditional base -
would acquire certain leyels of growth that would allow it to graduatc'into the next 
stage of development. The final step would see the society as a modem state - an 
'ideal society' that has achieved the goals of modernisation. This model, like many 
others, prm'ed to be too Eurocentl1c and foreign to "\frican realities. Many terms 
were associated with a similar idea. The mm'e from one system, whether termed 
'traditional', 'ag7cultural', 'dellelopin,g' or 'pJ7JJJitiz'c' towards a more 'urbanized', 'modcm', 
'de/doped' or 'adl'anced' state have all become associated \\;1.th modernisation. 
Huntington refers to Frank Sutton's (1955) identification of key characteristics that 
distinguishes a 'traditional' from a 'modern' society (I-Iuntington 1971 :286): 
TABLE 1: 
(Agri)Cultural society Modern industrial society 
Prcdominance of ascripti\T Predominance of urllYersalistic, specific and 
particularistic, diffuse pattcrns acrue\Tmcnt nonns 
Stable local groups and limitcd spatial mobility 
High degree of social mobility (in general-
though not necessarily in a 'vel1ical' scnse) 
Relati\Tly simple and stable 'occ1lpational' \\'ellrdcnlopcd occupational system, insulatcd 
differcntiation from othcr social strucrures 
A 'deferential' stratification system of diffusc 'Egalitarian' class system bascd on generalised 
impact. patterns of occupational acruen~ment 
Prcyalence of 'associatiolls' c.g. functionally 
specific, nonrascripti\'e strucrurcs 
Frank Sutton's (1955) identification of key characteristics that distinguishes a 'ImdilioJlili' from a 'modem' 











In short, Huntington (1971 :287) postulated that the difference between 
traditional and modern society lay in the way in \vhich man exercises control 
oyer his natural and social environment in relation to the expansion of scientific 
and technological knowledge. 
I\fodernisation was not limited to econOmlC growth howeyer. It also 
encapsulated governance in the mO\~e towards modern societies. A link was 
suggested between economic development and political de\~elopment. In this 
manner, the prerequisites for modernisation became the foundation for 
democracy. 
Later studies testing this causal relationship found communication to play 
a key role in achieving certain variables. 
Daniel Lerner (1957 cited in Winham 1970:811), for example, highlighted 
the importance of literacy and urbani7ation in de\'elopment. He indicated how 
the relationship between certain socio-economic yariables such as urbanization, 
education and communication influences political processes. This relationship 
was further tested and supported by Lipset (1959 cited in Winham 1970:811). He 
took a sample of 50 nations from Europe and Latin Amelica and diyided them 
into two camps: stable democracies and unstable democracies or dictatorships. 
By comparison, the democratic nations also showed a higher le\Tl of 
urbanisation, better communication structures and higher le\'els of education. 
The study was not without critique, howe\'er, and most of it was aimed at 
Lipset's strict definition of democracy.c Lipset's theory further postulated that if 
these trends were developed, conditions would arise that would faycmr 
democracy. In short, modernisation would bring about deYelopment, which in 
turn would create fa\'ourable conditions for democracy to flourish. 
Others, such as Lerner (1957), supported Lipset's findings (Hyden et al 
2002:2). Lerner, howeycr, expanded the instruments of modernisation to include 
mass media. He conducted a study in Balgat near Ankara, the Turkish capital. He 
found that in the village of Balgat, villagers were readily exchanging the security 
and rigidity of traditional culture for the "ullceJ1aiJlty and opp0J11mi!J' of tbe /iJlentietb 
{elltlf~J' illdllJtriai age" (cited in Hyden et al 2002:3). He argued that empathy was a 
catalyst to modernisation, because empathy enables indiyiduals to see themselves 
in the position of others. Empathy, according to Lerner, was acquired by tra\~elling 
In Lipsct"s studl" (1959), nations were either a dC!11ocracI" or nor, and democracy was not \-;C\\"ed as being; 











or with exposure to encounters with other cultures and civilisations through the 
mass media (ibid). Deutschmann conducted a similar study in an Andean Village 
in Colombia and found that exposure to mass communication systems were 
effecting changes in the villages. This, according to Deutschmann, pointed 
towards a shift from traditional ways toward what "migbt appropriatelY be tenned 
Jcient[fic and teclmological way" (Boadu 1981: 194-195). He also obsen'ed a shift 
from oral-traditional ways to mass communications. 
These theorists informed the assumptions around modernisation and 
illustrated the possibility of communication acting as the catalyst for change: the 
eradicator of tradition that will catapult societies to endorse and support modern, 
industrial workings. 
2.2 CRITIQUE OF THE ASSUMPTIONS OF MODERNISATION 
Did modernisation merely replace colonialism? The occurrence of 
modernisation theory during the post Second \,\'orld War period of 'colonial 
cleaJlJiJ~g' - granting colonies their independence - across the Third \,\'orld seems 
too incidental. Indeed the prescriptive tone of modernisation and its ideological 
cousin, development, does echo many of the ideals of colonialism. 
Political and economic de\'elopment are concerned \v-ith how to 'model7lz~re' 
Third World countries and how to transform 'traditional', 'primitil,e', 'barbmic' and 
'backuJard' African societies by imposing \X,'estern ideas of what ci\-ilization and 
modernity should look like (Dibua 2006:1). 
Political scientists analysing modernisation by way of the structural-
functionalist approach emphasised the "eroJioJ7 of traditional Jocial iJ1Jtitutiol1J aJ 
tnlcial i"dim of political delJelopment" (Dibua 2006: 1). Weber who di\-ided societies 
into either traditional or modern groups further de\'eloped this idea. Weber's 
di\-isional analysis of societies lies at the core of criticisms that highlight the 
almost pedantic approach followed by modernisation paradigms in Third World, 
or deyeloping, nations. As noted, Weber di\-ided societies into non-ideal and 
ideal societies. Africa was categorised as a non-ideal type, whilst 'X'estern nations 
represented ideal societies. In his argument, \'Veber further postulated that for 
non-ideal societies to cross the 'canyon' to rational, modern societies, they would 
ha\'e to discard their irrational, traditional features and attain: 
• IndltJtnaliJation 
• iHaJJ production 











• Dominance of science based tecbnolog)' 




\vnen this is obtained, according to \v'eber and supporters of 
modernisation, a society can be classified as modern and the metamorphosis of 
deyeloping to de\·eloped nation will be complete. Although this theory was 
de\"eloped during the early 1900s, many African societies haw barely made the 
jump to the Eurocentric model and, according to \V'estern classification and 
theory, haye thus failed to modernise successfully. 
Modernisation and its allies ha\"e been met by great cnl1Clsm from 
Dependency scholars who argue that the application of modernisation 
paradigms in "~frica has led to the continent being dependent on capitalist 
societies without enjoying the same status as \V'estern nations in the international 
realm. Market and other economic forces ha\"e resulted in Africa not being able 
to compete fairly on the import/export front for example. At the same time, 
states on the African continent are blamed for promoting anti-market 
deyelopment policies (Dibua 2006: 18). 
Furthermore, embedded paradoxes In modernisation haye resulted In 
O',"erall confusing and de stabilising policies. 
Contradictory conditions were set for the successful application of 
deyelopment policies aimed at achie\-ing modernisation. Initially, with the 
introduction of modernisation, it was felt that the moyement from traditional 
towards modern should be led by the state. Authoritarian states were seen to 
ha\'C the mechanisms in place to command and steer societies to accept and 
abide by deyelopment policies. In the 1940s and early 1950s, deyelopment 
economists were of the opinion that a strong and authoritarian de\'elopmcntal 
state would lend great support to economic de\·elopment (ibid:25). This idea was 
promoted by yarious studies, notably Alexander Gerschenkron's work on 
European economic history. Based on Gerschenkron's studies, deyclopmcnt 
economists argued from a comparatiyc perspecti\'e that, since analysis of the late 
industrialized countries of Europe (notably Germany, Russia and other eastcrn 











between democratic principlcs and de\'elopment, there was no reason to bclieve 
that Africa should be different (ibid:25). 
By cquating the charactcristics of post-colonial "\frica with those of early 
modern Europe, the contincnt's ability to transfonn to capitalism in the 
postcolonial era was sccn to be on par with European history. State intervcntion 
was regardcd as crucial in thc dcvelopment of capitalism in Europe - hence, in 
"\frica with its patrimonial tcndcncies, it was interprcted as lawful to be corrupt, 
as long as it was promoting and protecting the national capitalist class - or the 
bourgeois social order, as in Europe. This argument was also supported by 
arguments based on Weber's studies, highlighting "\frica's binary nature. In 
terms of this argumcnt, Africa is divided into two rcalms: 'public' and 'p17z'ote. ' Thc 
priyate realm is constructcd out of communal and cthno-regional sectors, whilst 
the public realm consists of the govcrnmental sector. In the samc argument, it is 
postulatcd that moral principles arc applied in the pri\'ate realm, whilc the public 
realm is governed by immoral principles, which subject it to irrational practiccs, 
such as exploitation and corruption (ibid:6). Bccause of the patrimonial nature of 
~\frican gm'ernments, the cultural inclination to satisfy the individual and his/her 
communal group was a soft target and easily exploited by intcrnational agencies 
who wantcd to bccome invoked in Africa for capitalistic cxpansion purposes. 
E\Tn with a shift towards a socicty-led application of de\'elopment policics, 
ccrtain Structural Adjustmcnt Programmes (SAPs) still rclicd on governments to 
implement some policics forcefully - which led to furthcr corruption and 
ultimately subjected these SAPs to SC\Tre criticism. 
Modcrnisation idcas bcing 'imposed' on Sub-Saharan "\frica, whilst at the 
same omc maintaining exclusivc market-related brackets, contradictory 
conditions for the exccution of dcvelopment policies that merely enhanced 
authOlitarian rule and unfair comparison with European stages of dcvelopment 
- all of thesc cast a shadow of distrust ovcr de\'elopment programmes and thc 
institutions bchind them. This resultcd in African nations developing a rcsen'cd 
approach towards modernisation policies, and ultimately in thc waning credibility 
of modcrnisation. 
2.3 AFRICA'S RESISTANCE TO l\IODERNISATION P,\RI\DIG"'fS 
During thc 1980s, the implemcntation of modernisation policies and ideals 
was well undcrway in ~Africa. Howc\'er, the Sub-Saharan rcgion remained in a 











was characterised by authoritarian gm'ernments, was increasingly expenencmg 
e\'er more fen'ent economic crises. 
Once again, the World Bank and the IMF stepped to the fore, suggesting a 
're\'isit' of pre\'iously adapted modernisation policies. 
Excessi\'e state intenTention was blamed for the low success rate of 
modernisation policies and the continent's O\'eralliack of development. 
It was suggested that an overall resttucturing of government-led 
de\'elopment policies should take place. Authoritarian governments had to be 
overthrown and neo-liberal democracy had to be instated in their place. This, 
according to Bretton Wood institutions and followers, would pro\'ide a solution 
to Africa's economic crisis. 
This idea was put fonvard under the gwse of SAPs. Even though 
development programmes had failed in Africa, modernisation continued under 
the guise of S/\Ps. Where a shift did occur, however, was within the neo-liberal 
policies now being imposed by these S"\Ps in conjunction with international 
agencies like the World Bank. 
\X,Den it became ev'ident that several states in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
growing increasingly disillusioned with modernisation, the role of these S1\PS was, 
amongst others, to implement political conditions and ideological policies, that, 
when met, would result in the prm'ision of grants to states. These conditions were 
an attempt to re-consttuct Africa in the \\lestern image and to assist the continent 
to mO\Te away from the 'i17vtional' towards the 'ILltional'. These 'condition .. ' 
included good gm'ernance, democratic principles and the alle\'iation of poverty 
whilst empowering grassroots. These policies also emphasised the "minimiJation 
of the role of the Jtate, maJJilJe devaluation qf national ctlJ7YllcieJ, dra,rtic reduction in Jtate 
e:;.,:penditlfreJ cJPecial6' 017 .. ocial JerJ!iceJ, P'7I'tlli,ralioJl of Jtate-oumed Clltetp17'JeJ, 
liiJelLlli.ratiol1 of tbe IlLlde regime and democratiJalioll" (ibid:27). This distinct mov'e away 
from authoritarian-led modernisation has been tenned post-modern liberalism, 
and it is this trajectory that has been applied in ~\frica until the present. 
The execution of the theory proYed to be less straightfonvard than a mere 
clinical approach to the theme could prm'ide. Initially, it was expected that rapid 
economic transformation would occur in developmental countries with 
authoritarian political organisation. This state-centrist approach was dominant 
in the 1960s and 1970s before it was overthrown b,' a new S"\Ps-drivcn 











for economic development. This new orthodoxy was championed by agencies 
such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which 
prm"ided aid with democratisation as a prerequisite. This worsened rather than 
imprm"ed the situation in African countries. The blame for the failure of SAPs 
was attributed to Africa's internal factors, such as "poor implementation ", 
patrimonialiJm" and "comtption" (ibid:3). 
" neo-
Arguments opposing modernisation and neo-modernisation were, and still 
are, loaded with the notion that the implementation of the modernisation theory 
has failed because it failed to consider ;\frican reality. Ignorance of 1\frica's 
realities, as noted by James Ferguson (1994 in Dibua 2006:3) has become the key 
denominator when analysing Africa's de\"Clopment (or lack thereof). 
In Africa, for instance, experts haye noted that the problems re,-oIYe 
around two broad themes: thc state and indi,-idual/ collecti\-e \'alues (ibid). 
These themes reflect Weber's perspecti,"C on modernisation, and highlight the 
fact that intcrnational and regional approaches to thc theme have become 
increasingly intertwined. 
Willist the application of Western infused uni,"ersalistic models in Africa 
have elicited critique from opposing scholars, ,"ery few of these suggest ways in 
which modernisation can be measured in "\frica. 
Those who venture to do so are often too Western, and so are their theories 
it would seem. Kwesi Yanbh argues that Western-based scholars ha,'e become 
alienated from the ~African reality since the \X'estern academy dictates 
"!be paradigmJ alld me/a-language in lJ/bicb ... (African) reali!)' Jbould be ordered, aJ Inll aJ 
colltrolJ tbe Jfrafegic outletJ of klIOJPied,ge diJJeminafioJl" (1995 in Dibua 2006:4). This 
,-iew is supported by Tiyambe Zeleza who argues that "tbe bl~rtOJical and contemporary 
relatiollJ of domination and dependency behpeen AJiica and fbe li7e .. !, ltill rm!!t in knouJlet{~e 
being related to tbe Jtmc/ureJ qfpOlver" (1995 in Dibua 2006:4), e.g. the West. 
Suggestions to analyse modernisation by comparing "\frican reality with a 
comparable stage in modern European history havc also been greeted with 
disdain: "Tigre comparatit)c JtudieJ bal'e oni} Jio1ber diJtOJ1ed Af!ictlll realitieJ became tbeir 
penpertil'eJ u'ere of a raciJt and impmaliJt natllre, u/hicb deJl~grated Afi7"call culture and 
JJe~~afed the role plq)'ed by indz;genom facton in Afiica'J dmlopJJleJlt" (Dibua 2006:5). 
Through this liberal/ ncoliberal approach, the development crisis in Africa has 











In short, cnllque levelled at modernisation in "\frica, holds that the 
liberal/neoliberal political economy of markets and liberal democracy do not 
comply with African realities and that it should be reyised. Modernisation has 
become a way of keeping Africa subservient to the international capitalist system 
and that this severely hindered ,\frica's development. Rather than being 
complementary to African realities, modernisation and its cousins have instead 
established contradictory relationships with the continent's realities and cultures. 
It is sugg;ested by Dibua (2006:5) that instead of replicating \\'estern institutions' 
road to deYelopment, Africa should turn to the crucial roles its own indigenous 
realities can and should play in the development process. 
The questions that arise are: what are the realities that the international 
realm is so worryingly out of touch with? Are these reabties not in need of 
drastic restructuring? Is such a move away from the 'traditional' necessarily 
negative, if it circumvents a collapse of the socia-economic status of the Sub-
Saharan continent? 
2.4 INTERNAT10NAL IDEOLOC1ES AND AFRICA~ REALlTTES 
The incorporation of political prerequisites in the post-modern liberalist 
paradigm has begged the question of whether dlis 'new' approach will deliver the 
outcomes which prior attempts failed to achieve. Will 'good gOI'emancc' and other 
political ideologies be valuable and workable substitutes in the de\Telopment 
formula that has thus far failed to pro\'ide solutions to ongOlng 
underdevelopment in Third World countries? This is e\'C11 more so as the 
formula prO\'ided for good cgolJemailCe' is based on the liberal-democratic pobty 
that is essentially \Vestern in nature. This formula has been fed to cultures and 
societies across the globe as if it has uniyersal deyclopmental rele\'ance across all 
cultures and societies (Leftwich 1993:6(5). 
\\ben analysing the strength of gO\'ernance in de\Tlopment one has to 
turn to modernisation theory, which postulated during the 1960s that 
de\'elopment would lead to democracy. What has occurred with the new 
approach to modernisation is the idea that democracy might be a PJ7·OJ7 or parallel 
to deyelopment as opposed to being a mere outcome (Leftwich 1993:605). 
Questioning the appbcability of Western-de\'eloped dleorics and ideas, 
Leftwich (1993:605) argues the assumption that ':.. 110 special preconditions are 
Jlfcessal]'/or stable democracy and tbat it caJ! (and sbould) be illstituted at almost all)' stage in 











Looking at Third World countries during d1e 1990s, he highlights the fact that 
few of the Third World and formerly non-democratic clites ha\'e embraced 
democracy wid1 much enthusiasm, commitment or success. E\'en in the 21" 
century, dUs situation has not improved, with most former authoritarian Third 
\v'orld states embracing a form of quasi-democracy that is characterised by one-
party dominance as opposed to fair competition. E\'en in South Africa, for many 
the example of African success, governance is characterised by one-party 
dominance, with the leading African National Congress (1\NC) winning 
mTrwhelmingly in all elections. Leftwich (1993:606) warns, in an almost 
apocalyptic manner, that few Third World countries exhibit the conditions that 
will sustain democracy, and that dUs might lead to ': .. an era of democratic relJersal, 
not democratic consolidation. " 
This dissertation has highlighted the growmg disillusionment with 
modernisation paradigms during the 1980s. The effect that the post-war, state-led 
de\Tlopment paradigm has had on Africa, howe\'er, still needs some elaboration. 
Firsdy, adjustment became increasingly politicalx, fmding its strength in a 
neoliberal modernist theory that promoted political liberalisation under the 
auspices of democracy in order to achieve economic and market liberalisation. 
111is interrelationship is also illustrated in agreements, such as the "\rticles of 
"\greement of the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Deyelopment 
(EBRD) of 1991, which combine economic and political objectives that aim to 
'promote JJlultiparty democracy, pluralism and market econoJJlic.!'. Even before dUs, 
howe\'er, d1e \Vorld Bank highlighted the influence of governance on 
development. Leftwich (1993) highlights a 1989 World Bank report on Africa 
that argues that, ''lJnder!ying the litany ~f Ajiica IS del'clopmenl problems is a crisis of 
gOI'Cm{IIlCe" (World Bank 1989 cited in Leftwch 1993:610) ... "Good gOl'enzance 
included some or all of the followin,gfeatures: efficient public smice; all independent judicial 
D'stem and a legal ji-ameuJork to enforce contracts; the accolfntable administration ~f public 
funds; all independent public auditor, re.rpollsible to a representatil1e legislature; respect for 
the ImlJ and h!l!JJan lights at all lel'els 0lgOl/emmellt,' a pluralistic imtilutioJJal structure 
and afree pres.r. " 
1\S Leftwich notes, these are all characteristics of liberal democracy, e\'en 
though the \Vorld Bank promotes these as "Iargeb' flfnrtioJlal and illstitutional 
, 'lh, tcnn is used by Nelson (1989) in Lcft\\;ch (1993:607), referring to the, for example, democratic 











prerequisites of dez1elopment" (cited in Leftwich 1993:610). o\lthough not always 
,~ehemently expressive about governance policies, the World Bank has always 
clearly equated good governance with ({sound del'elopment management", as evident 
in their statements, as highlighted by Moore (1993) in an article referring to the 
\\'orld Bank's (1992) approach to gm'ernance and dewlopment (cited in 
Leftwich 1993:610). 
Critics, like Leftwich (1993:612), would argue that tl1e prerequisites of the 
\'('orld Bank and other international institutions haye become part of the emerging 
politics of the New World Order, and that the foundation of this New \'('orld Order 
is build on Western liberal democracy. For iUrican states, and other Third World 
countries, good governance (as informed by Western liberal theories) is not easily 
achienble. This is not because it is not desirable, but because the institutions that 
are in place cannot sustain it. 
\'(nen theJe African realities are not taken into account, deyelopment 
efforts founded on the principle that there is a gradual mm"ement through 
certain stages of development, would not be successful. Political and social 
structures in Africa are remarkably different from those in any of the European 
states on which developmental paradigms were founded. Indeed the core part of 
Leftwich's (1993) dissertation touches upon this point. 
Leftwich's argument raises the question whether ,Utica's seemingly 
undewloped economic and political sphere is due to African resistance to \'(iestern 
principles or 1\frica's incompatibility with post-modem liberalist paradigms. 
Leftwich (1993:617) correctly cites Ekeh (1975) that few African states 
could be described as :reCltre', since many are ({f!mved by lou; lel'el.r of leJ!,itilJlaCJ~ conSeJlJ!!J 
and elite commitment." I f one adds to this economic Clises, ethnic and regional 
pluralism and conflicts, one-party dominance, declining health care, human rights 
abuses, the growing gap between rich and poor, lack of loyal opposition and low 
educational and GDP levels, then one arri"es at a 'Try dismal conclusion - that 
modernisation paradigms did not del1Yer tl1e expected results. It is generally 
acknowledged, as noted by Ajulu (2001:29) that the I~fFj\\'B policies have had 
little success in fostering economic f,>Towth. It has been just the opposite. Ajulu 
(ibid) notes that the intervention of the IMF j\\'B in ;\frica oyer the last 20 years 
ha,"e only led to ({economic Jtagnation, uoide.rpread pOI'ert)' and the diJinte,Rratioll of Afiica'J 
Jocialfafnic 011 a11 unmitigated scale. " Africa's debt burden continues to grow, whilst 











"\julu 2001:29). The Sub-Saharan region, then, appeared to be underdeyeloped, 
pre-liberal and generally economically and socially flawed. 
Howeyer, to dismiss all \X,'estern theories as if they ha\Oe no place in the 
African political realm would be a great academic error. Finding African solutions 
to African problems may sound grandiose but one cannot ignore the fact that 
,\frica is part of a global body and that this continent \vith all its states should 
function in a symbiosis with all spheres of the international realm. 
\Xben state leaders, like South African former-president Thabo Mbeki, call 
for African political renewal and economic regeneration, and "\frican institutions 
like the New Partnership for Africa's De\Telopment (NEPAD) are founded, then 
one should be aware of preyious experiences (failures and successes) in Africa's 
modernising past, whilst not condemning African solutions to adjusting the future. 
The idea of an African renaissance has trickled into \"arious political and 
socio-economic realms. 'Aj17·calli.ration' has become the idea associated with the 
general emancipation of the African continent. ,\flican approaches, theories and 
implementations should ensure the 'rebirtb and reJJeJPa!' of the continent. 
This is not a ncw call, howe\·cr. Discussions centring on Third \X/orld 
communication policies (specifically in relation to the N\XiICO discussed later in 
this dissertation) and democracy has been a less than straightforward debate since 
the inception of dc\oclopment. 
\X,Testcrn goyernments have traditionally maintained that the diffusion of 
new communication tcchnologies in a competiti\Te free-market environment 
would be conduciyc to a frcc flow of information and that it would assist in 
wider political participation in democratic processes (Ayish 1993:49H). \Xbilst the 
free flow of information was not readily accepted in all "\flican countries that 
were still mainly operating on an authoritarian or social-authoritarian media 
system, the call for democracy was echoed by \Oarious regional institutions and 
regional focusscd commissions such as the Organisation for "\frican Unity 
(0 "\lJ), the Organisation of Islamic Confcrences (OIC) , the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA) and the LTN Interagency Task Force on 
UNPAAERD (Braue 1990 in Ayish 1993:499). 
It would seem, though, that e\Ten with the best intentions to 'rejtflJenate'the 
African continent with solutions that are sensitiye to the African context, thcsc 
"\frican organisations fail to show a higher success rate than any of the 











1fodernisation is not dead. The term has become contested and neither a 
regional nor an international solution is coming to the fore. Howeyer, theories 
on communication informing the modernisation theme, as de\Oeloped by 
international agencies, have merit and should not be disregarded. I t is these 











SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 
TIlls section looked at the modernisation paradigm and illustrated how 
modernisation theory clearly stipulated a deyelopmental path characterised by the 
erosion of traditional values and realities and the uniform application of western 
yalues and thought systems. Modernisation theory O\'erall assumed that Sub~ 
Saharan Africa should advance in order for the region to participate in the one 
economic order that was envisaged and signed at the Bretton \Voods conference. 
~\s an ideal this was fundamentally flawed. If the Bretton \'V'oods conference and 
its core members had set out to deyelop "\frica's own resources so that the 
continent could effectiyely and meaningfully ha\'e participated in world markets, 
this continent's socio~economic landscape would ha\'e looked wholly different 
than it docs today. 
Due to unequal wealth distribution and a one~minded approach aimed at 
spearheading Africa to become industrialised, merely caused dependency of the 
continent on the market forces driving modernisation theory. 
The exploitation of Africa for its raw materials by the rich west is often cited 
in dependency literature as another factor that contributed to the lack of Africa to 
progress through Rostow's proposed stages of t,'lO\vth. Africa as an 
underdeveloped continent in many ways contributed to the west's deyelopment -
the sla\'e trade for example, where slaws were taken from Africa to the Caribbean 
and were forced to do unpaid labour which ad\'anced sugar and cotton 
production. These in turn were exported to Europe at huge profits Qoshi 2005:5). 
O\'erall development efforts should focus its ideals to cater for the rural dweller 
for example, assisting him/her with crop production by prm'iding fertilisers and 
much needed water retention systems before focusing on urban development that 
only caters for those who are already at a more ad\'anced stage of development ~ 
the link between agriculture and modernisation is well documented after all and if 
this relationship is in balance it will benefit all on \'arious levels of de\'elopment. 
Africa should furthermore be afforded the right and means by the 
international community to develop its own people and to extract its own 
resources for its own modernisation as opposed to ha\mg international companies 
expose d1e continent's resources without its citizens reaping the benefits - as is the 











A pertinent factor that is emphasised throughout this dissertation is the fact 
that modernisation theory was applied to the continent, termed as "traditional", 
"primitil1e': "barbaric" and "bockuJard" by the enforcers (Dibua 2006:1), without 
taking into account the social realities of the continent that largely rendered 
modernisation theory, its core ideals and asswnptions, obsolete. Apart from the 
continent's intricate political-social structures that were disrupted by colonialism, 
sla\"e trade and western missionary groups, Africa's structures were also se\rercly 
tampered with by the trial-and-error approach that was followed by modernisation 
processes that supported authoritarian gm"ernance the one day, and criticised it the 
next. This judgement error was also not rcctificd, since the S,\Ps that were tasked 
to enforce 'sound governancc' on a manipulated Africa were met with disdain and 
criticism from its inhabitants - with good reason. 
Africa should neyer haye been compared with Europe as it is remarkably 
different - its social-cultural structures being just onc of many examples. In 
Nigeria alonc, there arc 250 tribes that speak different languages and/or dialects. 
Their interaction and interrelationships are based on vastly different governmcnt 
and socio-economic structures. Nowhere was this the case in Europe. Earlier 
modernisation theorists who cited Europe as an example to prml.de dc\relopment 
methods disregarded this fact. With regards to Africa this was a gross mistake, 
which the S~r\Ps were unsuccessful to remedy. The re\l.sed conditions of libcral 
democracy as an agent for economic de\"elopment echocs thc Bretton Woods 
institutions, like the IMF and WB's lack of understanding for "\frican realities. Like 
other conditions, western liberal democracy is an un-African paradigm that is 
forced on the continent ignoring the local and regional realities. 
The following chapter examines the priority communications, which 
succeeded to achieve the highlighted paradigms of modernisation and democracy, 
and how tl1e Bretton Woods School of De\"elopment Communication failed to 
take into account certain realities faced by the continent that hampered the 












INTERRELATIONAL CONCEPTS: MODERNISATION, 
COMMUNICATIONS AND DEMOCRACY 
3.1. COMMUNICATION AND DEMOCRACY (AS AN Ol'TFLOW OF 
D EVELOPl\fENT) 
Hyden and Leslie (et al 2002:2) note that the role of communications in 
national deyelopment receiyed considerable attention during the 1950s and 1960s 
when modernisation was at its peak. \'(,'hilst the focus at the time was not on the 
establishment of democracy per Je, democracy was considered a by-product of 
socio-economic development. 
The argwnent was in essence that democracy would only be possible once 
society has been modernised. As noted, the conditions that were considered 
congenial to democracy were: industrialisation, urbanisation, modern education 
and a spread of the market economy. The link between these conditions and 
democracy was confirmed by Lipset (1959). During the same period, however, 
mass media, or communication, was in,'estigated by Daniel Lerner (1957) as a link in 
modernisation and wider economic and political participation. (See: Illustration 1) 
Lerner categorized individual respondents in levels of advancement: 
traditional, transitional and modern. Similar to the argument put forward in 
Roger's 'DifjifJion of JnnOlJationJ' (1962), Lerner argued in favour of the media's 
ability to in,'oke empathy towards certain personalities. In his \;ew media exposure 
and literacy should have led to economic and political participation. 
This is in line with the liberalist approach to communication; which is clearly 
defined by Siebert et al (1956) in Four Theories of the Press. The Libertarian 
Theory of the Press has oyer the years e\'olYed into the most oyerall accepted 
approach to the media since it supports a \'(,'estern thought process of democracy 
and freedom of speech. Howeyer, in ,\frica, a combination of Siebert's theories is 
applicable. These will be elaborated on later in this dissertation. 
,\part from communication's role in de\'eioping, and supporung, 
democracy, communication was also being imTstigated as an important link in 
modernisation. For example, findings of Lerner's study titled PaJJill,~ qf Traditional 
Societ),: Moderlli;dng the Afiddle Emt (1950), in which the importance of mass media 











the United Nations General Assembly called for a programme that combined 
national dcyelopmcnt with the cxpansion of deYeloping nations' mass media. 
Under the auspices of UNESCO the importance of mass media and deyelopment 
continued to be highlighted in economic de\'elopment plans (see illustration 3). 
The idea that communications could become thc crucial factor that could 
acceleratc the dcyelopment of Third \X'orld nations, as suggcsted in Rostow's theory 
of growth, to where thcy become self-sustaining nations became popular. This 
theory was put to practice by Wilbur Schramm who was in\'oked in a prcparatory 
work by UNESCO and cdited a yolume called Alass l\ledia and j\'ational DelJelopl1leni. 
Schramm's work concentratcd on cases from Africa, Asia and Latin America. \Xbilst 
it noted the dismal state of communications in "\frica, it also emphasiscd the 
potential of communication to makc a difference in agricultural de\Tlopment and 
health care - not unlike to what Rogers suggested in his paradigm of the role of 
mass media in creating a climatc for modernisation (table 2): 
TABLE 2: 
Modernising Climate for Adoption of Consequences in 







1. Active information 1 .. \ warene~s and 
Seeking correct information 
about innoyation~ 
1 
2. Favourable attitude 2. f'ayourable 
toward changc attitudc toward 
innO\'ations 
1 




1. Higher agricultural 
actiyity 
2. Fewer children pcr 
completed family 
3. Better hcalth and 
nutrition 
4. Perceived self 




4. Continued 4. \X'idcr political 
adoption (rather than participation 
discontinuance of 
innovations) 
Paradigm of the role of mass media in creating a climate for modernisation, leading to the adoption of 
















Wider economic and 
~ political participation 
Media Exposure 
Seguential and Co-cxtenSi\T Presentation of Lerner's (195H in Salcedo 1971 :CJ27) \fodel of '\fodernisation. 
All these changes were in essence based on the theory of the diffusion of 
innm-ations that emphasised the power of commW1.ication effects. "-\s \v-ith state 
leaders, communications could support modernisation by creating media messages 
that sustain and enhance knowledge of new practices, whilst persuading the 
audience to adopt external innmTations linked to de\-e!opment. Rogers defined the 
diffusion of ideas more particularly when he defined de\-e!opment as "a IJpe of 
Joria! (hanL~e in which 11C1JJ ideaJ are introduced into a Jocia! D'Jtem ill order to produce higher 
per capita incomeJ and ielJelr of iilJing through more modem production methodr and improl!cd 
Joria! orgaJll~ration!J (Melkote 2003:135). 
3.1.1. ComtraintJ to the Eifect ojCoJJlJJlullicatioJJ Oil DeJ'eiopmeJJ! EJIortJ 
The theories of Lipset, Lerner and Schranun, together with those of 
other de\Tlopment optimists, were seyercly challenged when efforts to 
incorporate the mass media in deyelopment processes prmTed ineffectiye. 
Third \vorld countries seemed to be unresponsi\-e to new media 
technologies. 
It was found that individuals were not \villing to readily take risks, as in the 
case of Lerner's study (referred to Jupra) on the Balgat \-illagers. TIns was blamed 
either on a lack of material resources or on the role of powerful indiyiduals or 
groups within society that prevented progress. Rogers, Lerner and Schramm 
acknowledged that their approach to and conceptualisation of deyelopment 
might haye been oycrsimplified by focusing too narrowly on indi\-iduals as 
agents of change, by basing their theories on uni\-crsal models of e\-olution, and 
thus ignOlIDg culture spccificity, and by cmphasising the mass mcdia (I-Iuesca 
2003:214). 
Rogers' five stages of diffusion were also greatly challenged in TI1ird 











During adoption audience members or readers had to decide whcther to adopt 
or reject an innm'ation. This was ,1.ewed as the last step of a linear process 
consisting of fi,'e steps, namely: 1) awareness 2) interest 3) enluation 4) trial and 
5) adoption (Melkote 2003:135). The graduation from onc step to another was 
hampcred by socio-economic factors. Diffusion studies found that those morc 
likely to adopt media messages "u)ere )'ollllger, had higber Jocial st[ltUJ, had a more 
jm'ourable financial status, engt{f!,ed ill more .specialised operation, alld u'ere equipped witb 
l,reater mental abilities tban later adopterJ" (as cited by Melkote 2003:135). Rogers 
further found that other factors such as limited exposure, message irrelenncy and 
low credibility resulted in mass media messages ha\wg little effect on rural, 
traditional nations in less developed countries (Rogers 1974:44-54). 
He elaborated on what has been established as one of the main concerns in 
message transmission in less developed countries - the fact that the majority of 
audience members in developing nations are not exposed to mass media channels: 
"For imtance, in ieH delJeloped natiom about one-third of tbe loillage audience iJ not 
in tbe audience jar an)' of the maJJ media, about oJle-tbird iJ reacbed all!)' b), radio and 
rough!), OIle-tbird iJ in tbe audience/or botb tbe electronic maH media, Jueb aJ radio, and tbe 
prillt lJJaH media, .rueh aJ JleJv.rjJaperr and maga;dJleJ" (Ibid A 7). 
Cost and illiteracy contributed to thc limited exposure. Furthermore 
Rogers (1974) found that the message content was not taking the needs and 
realities of less de"cloped nations into account. Most message contents were 
shown to be: 
1. "CoJlJtlmato~)' - tbat iJjor entertainment plllpoJeJ - rather than illJtmJJlental,' 
2. im:lelJant to the injomlatioll needJ 0/ mral, non-elite audieJlceJ; 
3. and del!oid ~f "houLto" information about illn01'ationJ ill agl7'C1Iltllre, healtb and 
nlltJitioJl,jami!y planning and community dfl'elopmellt" (Ibid). 
Apart from these realisations, another important reality surfaced. \'Vell into 
the ad,'anced years of modernisation, the government was seen as the main 
whicle in executing de\'elopment. The top-down diffusion of modern ideas and 
\'V"estern principles negated the importance of diffusion from grassroots towards 
top stlUctures and other sub-systems. It was only later that the international 
community conccded that government might also be part of the problem and in 
1976, Schramm and Lerner proposed a bottom-up participatory development 
paradigm. This is \'cry important to understand the media em-ironment in Africa 











programmes, which included the mass media. People were spoken to, and not 
allowed to speak. \'V'hen a new form of deyelopment was executed under the 
auspices of post-modern liberalism, governments were still acting as they were 
told, controlling the public. This phenomenon is still e\'ident in many African 
countries today. It seems like the shift from Authoritarian to libertarian has just 
not occurred. Many deyeloping countries remain seemingly stagnant in a 
'modernising' state whilst being blamed for not de\-eloping into a post-modern 
liberal state. \'V'hy has this shift not occurred? \'V'hy is there this resistance to 
moye into the post-modern liberal realm and what are the mechanisms that are 
applied to establish this resistance? 
It was realised that communities needed to be empowered to de\relop and 
implement messages. Goyernment control oyer communication systems can 
create biased agendas aimed at empowering officials rather than Clt1Zens, but 
more importantly, government control m"er mass media, especially the electronic 
media can also contribute to communication channels or sources ha\'ing little 
credibility in communities. Rogers pointed out that the pro-modernisation theme 
ad\"anced \-ia the mass media by gm"ernments has resulted in the media 
appearing subjecti\Te since there is no plurality of \-oices (Rogers 1974:48). 
Initial studies on modernisation showed that urbanisation held the 
preeminent position in factors leading to modernisation (Lerner 1965, Hoselitz 
1962 in Edeani 1980:63). This \'iew was greatly challenged by Inkeles and Smith 
(1974 quoted by Edeani 1980:63) who concluded from a study inyohmg six less 
deYcloped countries from Africa, Asia and Latin ;\merica that urbanisation "was of 
little or no C011JequeJlCe as predictor llan'able" (ibid:63). Lerner, in particular, argued that 
the deyelopmental sequence went from urbanisation to communication and then 
political participation (ibid). Since Lerner concluded his study in 1950, Schramm 
and Rugels (1967) argued that Lerner's theory had become outdated with the 
spread of technological developments. In 1967, when this counterargument 
emerged, the area of communication was still yair!/ limited, but the use of 
transistor radios and other factors that supported the spread of communications, 
such as better roads and rapid transportation appeared. Tn their study they 
demonstrated the existence of a positi\Te relationship between "economic and social 












The key factors contributing to the success of the modernisation process 
were belie\'ed to be due to the integratiye and interacti\'e capabilities of the media. 
\v'ith the theoretical notion that "comlJlunicatioll is the basic social q),namic in every 
socie!/" according to Fagen (1966) and Almond and Powell (1966 cited in Edeani 
1980:71), the mass media was yiewed as the guardians who preyented against the 
disintegration of society, in a society that has mowd beyond the traditional face~ 
to~face communication system to a more de\'eloped system. 
This theory relies on systems theory in which mass communication is a 
subsystem that 'herds' a differentiating society towards a common goal. 
Schramm (1963 in Boadu 1981:194~ 195) elaborated on this relationship: 
"As nations mOlle from the patterns of traditional sociei)' toU'ards the patterns of 
lJlodern indtlstn'al Jocie!)~ .rpectacular del'elopmenlJ lake place in tbeir communication. From 
one point of t'ieu', dellelopments in comJJlunication are brought about I!)' economic, social and 
political el'olution ivhich is part of the national groultb. From anotbel" l'iew point, bO)JJellel~ 
thq are among the cbief makes and mover.! of tbat ellolution. " 
This influential role of mass communication on society was substantiated 
by Deutschmann (1963 in Edeani 1980:195) who conducted a study on the use 
of mass media systems in an Andean \rillage in Colombia. Boadu (1980: 195) 
argued that Deutschmann's findings could pw\'ide insight into the pen'asive 
influence of mass media systems in £\Erica. Deutschmann (1963 in Boadu 
1980: 195) found: 
1) "An 0lJJe17latioJl shiftfrom oral-traditional to maJJ C01J2JJllf17ication. 
2) E"PoJlIre to the mass communication D'stems llJelT effecting changes in the Andean 
zillagm in wap that point to a shift from traditional u!{?)'s toward what might 
appropriate/} be termed scientific and technological iPa)'-r. " 
Boadu (1980:195) also noted that the trends \-1sible in Africa suggested 
that indiyiduals with greater exposure to the media were more likely to show 
higher le\-els of knowledge of political, health and educational matters. £\Iso, he 
added, the attitude of those who are exposed to the media were "markedb' more 
co1lJistent 1I.ith national development meJJages carned ~)' the media, as oppoJed to thoJe who 
bat'e l'C1)' little or 110 contact wilb tbe media" (ibid). In this sense, the media senTS as 
transformers of society, transforming the yalues, attitudes and beha\Tiours of 
traditional society (also noted by West & Fair 1993:91). It was hypothesised that 
the traditional masses would gra\-1tate towards modern systems with the 
necessary exposure. This is what Lerner termed the motive force in the "rel'olutioJl 











portrayal of la\1.sh \Vestern lifestyles on entertalllment channels that have 
become widely distributed with the help of satellite TV might mmT masses to 
aspire towards more modern lifestyles, or it might simply highlight socio-
economic hardships and increase dissatisfaction and frustration among the poor. 
The causal relationship highlighted by these studies underscores the main 
ideas of communication and modernisation theory: that communication serves 
as a complex system, fulfilling certain social functions, and that it is not merely 
an interplay between source and recei\'er (1\1elkote 2001: 133). 
Rogers, howeYer, challenged this \1.ew, arguing that although media exposure 
might lead or assist in development, the necessary socio-economic factors are not 
always in place to allow this exposure to take place. He cited some \'ariables that 
might intet\'ene in this much needed exposure component. Boadu (1981:196) 
highlighted the following conclusions from Rogers' study (1956 - 1966): 
1) (~HaSJ media e>..posure appears to be aJJociated positiI'e!y witb ,wcb l'aJ7abies as 
socio-economic status, junctional litera~)', urballization, oCCllpatioll, empatlD', 
opinion leadenbip, knowledge and illJlOl'atiz'eneSJ. 
2) Certain /'an'ableJ m(1)/ be conceit'ed alldjound to be antecedent and c01lsequent to 
maJJ media exposure and man media exposure in one instance 1Jlz~~bt be regarded 
aJ an illten/ellol: 
3) lHaH media e>..posure is on/), an arbitral]' begi171lill,~ of a difjifsioll proceH; tbe 
ultimate COllJequences in part depend on tbe cOlliiguratioll and nature of socio-
economic mtllJorks bC)'ond tbe poinls of contact. 
4) lHaH media effects on tbe modernisation of a C01JJJJllfllity call be of comiderable 
uJeigbt and bigbl;' relelJant to olber l'a17ables inl'oll'cd ill moderniJalioll. " 
It is \-ery important to highlight Rogers' conclusion that certain antecedents 
allow indi\;duals to enjoy greater exposure to the media, which in turn will lead to 
modernisation. If these antecedents are missing, modernisation would be 
hampered. These antecedents were shown to be predominantly socio-economic 
related - functional literacy, education, social status and age - all \'ariables that 
remain a problem in Africa.'} 
3.2 THEORIES OF THE PRESS 
\Xnen discussions surrounding the relationship between the media and 
gm-ernment arise, the theories developed by Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and 
\X'ilbur Schramm in 1956, perhaps prm1.de the most comprehensive t,'llide 
between the different theories underl)mg the complex rationale tl1at affects 
') 'nus fact is highlighted throughout the clissertation in \'arious sections. Take note of the factors hampering 
media's link \\~th democracy on p.47. This is also elaborated on in the tlnal chapter on traditional societies 











"reiatiomhips between indiz,iduais, the media, institutions aJld the state witbin Afiica itse!f" 
(Siebert et al 1965 cited in Ocitti 1999:7). Siebert (et al) analysis' of the four theories 
of the press (treated as the media in general and not limited to newspapers) provides 
a framework of different media theories and their intriguing interrelationship with 
other sectors of society, whether tangible or philosophical ideals. It also notes that 
differentiating media landscapes would exhibit a stronger support for one single 
theory or a combination of all or few. Africa's landscape, for example, does not only 
reflect the Libertarian Theory, instead it also includes the Authoritarian Theory, 
Social Responsibility Theory and the Sm"iet Communist Theory. 
These theories are well documented and an in~depth analysis of all is not 
necessary for purposes serving this dissertation. In short it can be noted that the 
Libertarian Theory of the press has over the years e,"oh"ed into the most overall 
accepted approach to the media since it supports a \X'estern thought process of 
democracy and freedom of speech. It is also this theory that is most seYerely 
scrutinised in this dissertation due to the manner in which it has been uniformly 
enforced in Africa. 
Howeyer, since Africa hosts a combination of all four theories, one will 
note that (some) media in (some) African countries also reflect strong ties to 
gOYernment advancing the rules of the ruling system, characterised by 
dictatorship, military rule, one~party systems and lack of democratic 
consolidation (Authoritarian), much likened to the Sm"iet Communist Theory, 
the media in these states can often stand in sen"ice of the ruling party or state, by 
means of self censorship or gm"ernment censorship. 
Lastly, the Social Responsibility Theory is yery much an outflow of the 
Libertarian model, since media and social deyclopments refocused on the 
consumer and the media's relationship towards its receiYer. The media as educator, 
informer and entertainer emerged. Indeed the factors used to measure the 
efficiency of tl1e media in most countries h3\"e been based on a combination of the 
Libertarian and Social Responsibility theory of the press. This hybrid asserts liberal 
principles, supporting ideas and notions that are democratic in character, such as 
pluralism, participation and unification of the masses. This model of 
communication has become the most prominent and almost exclusi,"e version of 
communication. Since little let,ritimacy has been given to an Africa~sensiti,"e model, 
measurement of media~efficiency still occurs using the libertarian model of the 











The main assumptions of this model are: 
• The media is a fourth branch if gOlJemment, acting as a 1patciJdog to keep the other 
branches qf govemment, and otber instztutions accountablefor their promires and actions. 
• Tbe media Jhould keep people informed to enable tbem to make inj017Jled cboiceJ. 
• The media should create and maintain a sphere of political disco/me. 
• Tbe media s/Jould educate the public so tbat tbe public can bold gOl,e17Jment 
accountable. 
The Libertarian Model of communication, like the ideals of modernisation 
and de\'elopment, is Western in nature. It is not surprising, then, that the general 
international feeling (as expressed by authors ~Ierrill (1974) and J akubowi7C 
(1995) both cited in Agbese 2006:18) that the ultimate goal of transitional media 
systems is to become westernised. It is seemingly suggested by them that the 
mass media will only be able to assist in political transition if these libertarian 
principles, informed by the Libertarian Theory of the press, are in place. In order 
to achie\"e these principles fully, the media should be free from censorship and 
gm·ernment scrutiny. A free media and democracy are often quoted as pairs. 
Historically all these press theories are of variant importance to d1e issue of 
de\'elopment but Ocitti (1999: 11) notes that future de\"c!opments increase the 
reb'ance of theories as advanced by McQuail (1994) namely the DeYelopment 
~fcdia 111eory and the Democratic-Participant Media Theory. 
Both these theories support suggestions that Africa does not ha\'e the 
infrastructures needed to support the ad\'ancement of media technologies and its 
accompanying influences e.g. development and democracy. 
3.3 MEDL\ AND DEMOCRACY 
Once the connection between modernisation, or post-modern liberalism, 
and democracy is established, the role communications play in the process can 
be im"estigated. The assumption that the media plays a \·ery influential role in 
shaping and supporting democracy is not disputed. \'xlhat is questionable, 
howe\Tr, is whether the communication systems used in this constructi\i.st and 
supportive role in developing countries should be similar to those existing in 
already developed, industrialised countries. 
The causal link between democracy and de\"elopment has been noted and 











on socio-economic de\'elopment first and democracy second. Democracy was 
regarded as a product of a combination of industrialisation, urbanisation, modern 
education and the spread of the market economy. A study by Lipset was briefly 
quoted to substantiate this theory. In a review of a study by Leftwich (1993), it 
was shown that the causal relationship could also work \'ice versa, with 
democracy influencing the level and speed of deyelopment. The flow of this 
relationship is not of cardinal importance to this dissertation. It is anticipated 
that both variables have an influence on one another, and that the flow is not 
one-directional. 
'X'hat is important is to note that it has been argued that the media has an 
influence on both variables. The media thus acts as a type of umbrella over these 
terms, influencing both, and with these \'ariables in turn influencing each other. 
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111e mass media acts as an umbrella influencing both technological and economical de\'clopment, 
as well as effecting changes in g(wernment. 
Hyden et al (2002:7) note that the relationship within this causal diagram is 
C\Tn more complex: 'W'bat happem in one domain, hon.'e!.'e1; is 1701 isolaledfimn }vhat 
L~oes on elsewhere ... For example, modern information tecbllology may shape botb media 
oll lnenhip pattemJ and cultural !mleJ, wbile aim being JlIu/ect to political manipulation I:)' 
eilher Jtale or societal actors. Similarb', an expamion offreedom of e:preJJion lIla)' enhance 
the confidence of citizem to pCl11icipate in the political proceJJ, bllt il ma)' also {reate itJ own 
backlmb ill reJlIltilz~ in political!y more repreJJil le r\gimes. " 
By implication, thc relationship between goyernance and development is 
not characterised by a downward flow alonc, but also by an upward flow in which 











Arguments, views and publications on the role of the media in politics, 
and specifically the role of the media in de\'elopment in Africa, all reflect a very 
strong call for an African character - a call for an African approach to the 
theme. Furthermore, a general struggle \vith bridging the gap to modernity 
without sacrificing certain cultural beha\'ioural patterns seems to dominate the 
debate (\Vest & Fair 1993:91-114, Boafo 1986:35-47). 
As was noted in Chapter 2, it was initially thought by western supporters 
of development that an authoritarian government would ha\'e more success in 
executing deyelopment policies. In reality, howe\'er, these gm-ernments not only 
exercised power over development policies but other branches of society as well. 
The notion of press freedom was until \'ery recently an abstract term, associated 
with disloyalty towards government leadership and its policies, and authoritarian 
gm'ernments in fact enjoyed exercising power oyer media institutions to control 
this aspect reflecting an Authoritarian Press Theory approach. They were, in 
essence, only building on the foundations of control that had been laid by the 
colonial authorities. This was further fuelled by modernisation policies that stood 
uncritical towards government's approach to communicative spaces, as criticism 
of policies and strategies were seen as harmful to national unity. Remarkably, 
what is often ignored is the fact that newspapers (for example) are not an 
African medium at all. The fact that it is a form of communication in Africa 
today is due to the continent's colonial heritage. 
\'Vhen African countries eventually gained independence, they experienced 
a social and economic crisis that hampered their de\Tlopmcnt, and made them 
increasingly dependent on the outside world. \Vith "\frica showing little progress 
during the first years of independence, and the noted disillusionment with 
modernisation policies, the chief response was another political transformation -
authoritarian gmTrnments were to be replaced by democratic government 
structures - and this was achieved with the application of neo-liberal SAPs. The 
\'\/orld Bank and the IMF included aid conditions that were supportive of liberal 
democratic forms of governance - of which a central component was press 
freedom. 
Although the level of press freedom enjoyed by "\frican media has increased 
m'er the last couple of decades, it is far from being a certain reality. Incidents like the 
ban on critical media in Zimbabwe, for instance, emphasise that the media in some 











Kareithi (2005:3), howe\'er, questions whether the b'el of criticism aimed at 
~:\frica's media is valid. He argues that such criticism is often rooted in Western 
libertarian theories of the media, in terms of which the potential for positive 
contribution by the party and the government in the de\'elopment of the press is 
usually not considered. Indeed, much of the criticism aimed at media across the 
globe is informed by the institutional literature, which is built on a model of 
the press (read media) that is \'Vestern in character. 111e analytical factors used to 
analyse the le\'el of freedom and the professionalism of the media have 
become globalised. These globalised factors, in turn, serve as indicators of the 
InTI of political freedom and the fonn of gmTrnance, in general. 
111e pressure exerted through SAPs for gm'ernment refonn has also put 
pressure on the level of media freedom, including the free flow of information 
reciprocated by public discussion and expression. 
Kareithi (ibid), and others, are not wrong in calling for an African approach 
to this theme. Howe\'er, where the issue of press freedom is concerned, one must 
realise that direct government interference in media issues is not d1e only factor 
suppressing the freedom of the media. In Africa, the media is limited e\Tn more 
so by socio-economic rather than political realities. Best (in Kareithi 2005:2) 
divided these problems into four categories in what he referred to as the "jour cn"JeJ 
o/commIfllication ill Africa", namely: the crisis of understanding, the crisis of power, 
the crisis of ownership and the crisis of resources. Yicky Randall (1993) supports 
this claim, arguing that Africa has to contend with constraints such as the degree 
of literacy, the amount of wealth and the s0e of the population. Yet, she argues, 
media in Africa has been able to contribute to democratic forms of governance, 
and she notes: "E:x.panJion of tbe national media, e.rpedal!y of tbe electronic media, tbe growtb 
in media proft.crionaliJm and tbe dramatic increaJe in tbe penetratil·e capacit), qf intemational 
comJJJtfniratiollJ baJJe eniJanced tiJat role" (Randall 1993:644). 
Howe\'er, as was suggested, d1e influence of media freedom, governance 
and de\Tlopment is not merely a one-way affair. 
Edeani (1980:64) tested the re\'ersed influence of supposed 'development 
\'ariables' on the level of press freedom. In his study, he examined the 











education and political participation in the determination of press freedom.
111 
He 
challenged the one-way Lerner model (1965) that only concentrates on the 
influence of communication development on political deyelopment. Lerner, as is 
noted by Edeani (ibid:64), fails to recognise mass communication's array of other 
influences. The media's influence on the level of literacy and incidental learning is 
particularly important (Mcrone & Cnudde 1967 in Edeani 1980:64). Edeani seems 
to sU~lSest that concerns as noted by Randall (1993) and others on the influence of 
education in communication development, is not entirely valid. Lerner (1965 in 
Edeani 1980:64) suggested that there was a sequential flow of influence from 
literacy to communication, but Edeani notes that with communication 
developments, the sequential flow might be re\Trsed from mass communication 
to literacy or education. People, in the words of Edeani, "no longer seem to u)ait until 
tbq are educated b~fore pqying attention to and learningfrom tbe man media" (1980:64). 
Edeani (1980:65) further criticises Lerner's model by arguing that whilst 
economic development exerts a 'relatively' strong influence on urbanisation, its 
impact on mass communication and literacy seem to be close to null. 
Press freedom and democracy, as suggested by gmTrnance policies, are 
paired, but in less-de\"eloped countries, press freedom does not unequi\'ocally 
equal democracy. Democracy, by definition, implies that governors should be held 
accountable by the masses, and often the media highlight this accountability. The 
media can also in certain cases act as an opposition where a formal strong 
opposition is lacking, thus challenging gmTrnment policies. This role of the mass 
media is impaired if the masses cannot respond to the media's challenges. 
i\S noted, the socio-economic realities in ~\frica do not always cater for a 
system where the influence of the media is direct and immediate. Apart from 
formal education, which by implication means schooling, importance should 
be gi\'en to political education. The masses must understand the concepts 
associated with democracy, such as .'freedom' and 'accountability.' Apathy in voters 
often sets in if they feel their \"otes do not make a difference. The media, like 
other institutions, should constantly highlight and teach citizens their roles in a 
democracy and the importance of political participation. At the same time the 
media should ensure that it maintains a high level of professionalism, and that 
1t remains economically viable to enable it to fulfil its watchdog role in a 
,,, In his stud,', Edcani (1980:64) ddined the \'ariable of press freedom as "Ihe exlOlI to lI,Neh illdiridlla/r and 
gm1fPJ hm'f the liberty to exlmJJ t/;eJ7lJelI'eJ timill.gh the JJ1an media. It a/", illr/J/(kJ liIJfl1)' lIillih )oll17ltzii.rtJ alld oilltr 











political bureaucracy and in other public and printe sectors in the community 
(Edeani 1980:65). 
It IS doubtful whether sufficient political knowledge and media 
professionalism are present in de\Tloping African states. It is thus questionable 
whether the necessary influence on de\-elopment can occur if these two factors 
need to be de\-eloped themselyes. The ob\,-jous solution seems to be to inyest 
more capital in communication systems and media traID111g. Lack of 
professionalism is often associated with lack of capital, as media houses and 
journalists are less prone to bribes and other forms of corruption if they are 
economically \,-jable. Media-training is thus also a cosdy, but \Try important aspect, 
to sustain a \,-jable communication system, especially in the light of the constant 
deyelopments in international communications that seek national application. 
\'\ben the media is adequate and the exposure to dle necessary 
communication media is present, it is likely that economic dewlopmcnt will also 
improye. Edeani (1980:71) writes: liThe magnitudes and s~gns of it, [mass 
communicatioll} relatiol1Jhips lJJith economic del'elopment, urbanization, and edllcatioll suggest 
tbat del'elopment of communication cbannels and cposure to pe11illCni z4(Jt7natioll stimulate 
economic del'elopJJle7lt, make people aJJJare of opp011l11lities aJ'al/abie in jbe cities, belp tbem to 
find tbeir u'a),s around in tbe cilie ..... [and} assist the indiz'idual not 0111)' to be aware and 
appreciate tbe l'allle of education, but a/,o to become educated. " 
,\ccess and influence thus go hand-in-hand. \'\ben factors hampering access 
are indentified and addressed, influence will increase. The imprm-ement of mcdia 
professionalism, enhanced education and increased pm-ert:)- alle\,-jation should, in 
terms of this argument, contribute to the b-el of media accessibilit:)- in deyeloping 
nations, and dlis in tum should fa\-our influence, whether political, social, 
ecological or economical. This dissertation would like to emphasise that the media 
does not play either a constructiyist or a supporti\-e role. TI1e media's transitional 
role in gowrnance and its role in supporting goyernance haye both been 
documented as equally important. It is howewr possible that the role and 
influence of national media under authorit.1.rian or other dictatorial regimes can be 
compromised due to the leyel/lack of media freedom allowed. In such a situation, 
the role of the international media would play an important role in prm,-jding 
information that is nationally compromised. Samuel Huntington discussed the 
power of global mass communication systems during the third wayc of 











information in countries where the media was generally gm'ernment-controlled. 
1bis contributed to the demonstrations and protests that spread across the 
continent ("\gbese 2006: 16). Once this transition to democracy has occurred, 
howe\Tr, national development policies should firstly ensure that national media 
can support the liberated form of goyernance, and secondly, that access to media 
is increased. In this manner the flow of information, de\relopment and democracy 











SUM11ARY OF CHAPTER 3 
This chapter outlined the modernisation paradigm and how it interrelates 
with communication and governance. A rather critical approach to the topic was 
followed to illustrate the areas of concern. It was illustrated how modernisation 
is based on liberal political theory and m-ertly grounded in \X'estern principles of 
de\'elopment, governance and communication. It was argued that some of these 
principles negate the realities faced by many de\'eloping countries today and that 
these called for a more Africa-sensiti\'e approach to the theme. 
By highlighting the theories and institutions that support the Bretton 
\\'oods School of Development Communication, it became clear that these 
international institutions face a general lack of effectiYeness. This was illustrated 
by looking at the examples of the World Bank, the I11F and other international 
institutions' policies that, on rollout, showed little success. 
Communication theories by Schramm, upset, Lerner and Rogers were 
presented to illustrate the prioritisation of communications within a de\'clopmental 
context. This relationship was, and still is, based on the principle that the mass 
media are an instrument that can influence and manipulate beha\'iour and assist in 
de\'elopment. It was highlighted how certain socio-economic factors, most 
notably poverty and illiteracy hamper the effecti\'e transnusslOn of 
communication messages, and how this can result in de\-elopment haying a 
limited effect in societies. Like Rostow (1979) proposed certain stages of 
de\'elopment, Rogers (1962) assumed with his 'Dzffusion of illIlOl'atiollS' theory that 
exposure would lead to receivers wanting to attain higher social levels and that this 
'lPill' for a higher social standing would encourage them to uplift themsekes. He 
argued that this aspiration gained from mass media exposure would encourage 
people to mm-e into the city (urbanisation) to achie\'e a higher Ji\'ing standard as 
illustrated in the media. Randall (1993) supported this claim by speculating that 
the portrayal of Western la\'ish lifestyles might inspire people to acquire the same 
lifestyle, or merely highlight the discrepancies between the de\'eloped and 
unde\'eloped world's leading to despondence and e\'en resistance. 
\\nat was found to be an o\'erall flaw in these theories is the fact that 
exposure is needed for diffusion of modernisation innoYations to take place. 
This exposure in ~:\frica is lacking to a great extent due to socio-economic, and 











These socio-economic realities are discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter, which focus on traditional African societies. It is suggested in 
the following chapter that there has to be a gradual, but defmitiye move away 
from the Bretton Woods School of Deyelopment Communication-thinking to a 












TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES AND "\FRIC\N REALITIES 
"I!y the]ear 2000, uith wiJdom and .lome luck, uJe aJ human race mq)' han Jucceeded 
at theJe aitical taJkJ: ... Within the human commtfllil)', the del'eloping nationJ, taken aJ a 
u'hole, uill balJe doubled tbeir preJent income per capita. Tbl!)' uill be approacbing leveLf ofper 
capita income n017J2al/y aJJociated with a rapidb' declining rate ?f population increaJe. Tbl!)' uJ/l1 
han acquired aJlotber quarter~century '.I expoience ?f modemiJation aJ }JJcll aJ competence in a 
much uidened range of tecbnologieJ. Tb~)' will be mftcb more capable of adjuJting to changinJ!, 
cirCUlnJtance and JOII!ing their problemJ in tbe rentu,)' bl!)'ond )) 
W.W. Rostow (1979:18) 
4.1 SeB-SAHARAN AFRICA: CO]\IMITME0JT TO CO~L\1L1NICATION, 
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRI\CY 
4.1.1. NWICO as Response to International Commllnication 
The frustration with Western-informed systems is not new or limited to 
this century. Since the 1970s, the dominance of Western-prescribed 
de\Oelopment models and their influence on communication systems has 
cuhmnated in mounting frustration in Third World countries, who felt that 
\'(7 estern dominance was a source of their 'tlllderdeIJelopJJlellt.' 
To counteract this dominance, the Third \'('orld called for a New World 
Information and Communication Order (N\X1CO) during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Much has been written on the subject and it is not the intention of this 
dissertation to elaborate too much on the goals and resulting agreements of the 
N\x1CO, as this introduces a work on its own. It highlights certain concerns 
noted by the NWTCO merely to underscore that discrepancies exist in media 
technologies that influence econOlmc and social de\~elopment. In following 
sections it is highlighted that the diyide between rich and poor nations continue 
to exist and impedes on socio-economic and political de\Oelopment, this is 
illustrated at the hand of Kenya's communication standards and challenges. 
In short, the N\,(!ICO sought to address (as noted in Fourie & Oosthuizen in 
Fourie 2001:416, emphasis added): 
• The imbalanced intemationalflO1JJ o/newf, in/017Jtalion and media enln1ainment; 
• InequitieJ in Ibe arena of intemational commlfllication; alld 











The N\V1CO was also a responsc to news, information and entertainment as 
forwarded by Western powers to reinforce their cconomic and military ideals as 
well as their political and cultural \'alues (ibid). Conccrn was also highlighted 
during the General conference of UNESCO in 1972 where attention was drawn 
to the way media of the richer nations were being applied as a means of 
dominating world public opinion (ibid). 
Following this, and underlying thc development of thc N\'V1CO was concerns 
about certain international communication inequalities that impede cconomic 
and social de\'elopmcnt. Fourie (2001:418) notes certain inequalities listed by 
Yincent in 1997 (ibid). These were: 
• Tbe dn'eloping world ba.r onlY jOllr percent oftbe ll'orld~r tOlJlp"ten. 
• Tbirt)'~follr cOlln/n'es q! tbe u10rld bali{' 110 telcl'isioll sets. 
• Afiiw (in tota~ baJ le.r.r tban tbree newrpapen per tOJ(llt~J' wbereaJ tbe Uniled 
StateJ baJ 1 687 and]apan 125 dailieJ. 
• Tbere are more telepbone lineJ ill To~)'o tball Oil tbe mtire A.fiicaJl c017tinent. 
111e N~1CO was also an outflow of an UNESCO conference in 1976 
that created the International Commission for the Stud\" of Communication 
Problems, known as thc McBride Commission. The l\kBride report on a New 
\,\'orld and Information Ordcr was published under the titlc ~\1aJl)' VoictJ: One 
IForld: Communication and Society Today alld Tom()17"ow i (1980). 
Two main components of the report were the principle of a free flow of 
information and the question of communication technologies. Third World 
countries were concerned about thc impact powerful conununication satellites, 
trans-border data flows, digital communications and interacti\T computerised data 
exchanges would ha\T on their political sm'ereignties and indigenous cultures 
(i\yish 1992:492). Secondly, the Maitland Commission of 1985 highlighted the gap 
in telecommunication resources betwccn industrialised and deyeloping nations, 
underscoring the N~1CO report's question of communication technologics. The 
Conurussion noted that three quarters of the 600 million telephones in the world 
were located in nine industrialised countries (Ayish 1992:495). 
In thc 21 ,t century these two main components of the McBride rcport 
remain an issue in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in addition to inequalitics linked to 
economic discrepancies, cultural and political differences also influcnce 
deyclopment and therefore 'brcaks' the link betwecn commurucanon, 











4.2 POLITICAL AND SOCIAL DISCREPA~CIES AS OBSTRUCTION TO 
DEYFLOPMENT IN AFRICA 
Sub-Saharan Africa has been criticised for not meeting d1e required goals as 
set out in ilie modernisation and deYClopment paradigms. Certain, if not most 
Sub-Saharan countries, still operate on a yery frail foundation of goyernance. 
~\ttempts to achieye reyolutionary social, political and economical transformation 
haye been met \\riili setbacks in some cases and utter failure in oiliers. 
The United Nations Human De\Oelopment Report on Democracy (HDR 
2002), states iliat "at current trendr a Jz~n!ficaJlt portio II of tbe )}Jor/d'J J/ateJ are unlike!y 
to acbiel'e .'iillennium DelJelopment goa!J, including tbe ol'erarcbillg tal:get of baMng extreme 
p01'ert)' b)' 2015." The report also notes what can only be described as d1e failure of 
dC\°clopment ideals. According to ilie report, many countries are poorer ilian iliey 
were "10, 20 and in Jome caJeJ 30)'earJ ago." But it is not only on socio-economical 
grounds d1at development has not succeeded; democracy as ilie proposed form of 
gm"Crnance is also failing: '.7UJt aJ trollbliJlJ!; tbcflllJb of eJfpb01ia tbat JaJ-V Ibe number of 
(oll1lIJieJ embracing mal!)' of the ballmarkr of dcmocrat]1 - pal1icttlarfy lllultipaltJ' electionr - Joar 
to 140 Ol'er tbe paJt 15)'earJ iJ Jtarling to tum inlo jl7lJtratioll and de.rpail:" (ibid) Add to 
iliis ilie high rate of illiteracy, inadequate infrastructures, debt burdens and 
disease, and a depressing picture materialises. 
Those critical of neo-liberal policies will attribute these failures to preyious 
neo-liberal dCYelopment efforts iliat failed (Akokpari 2005:1). 1\ccording to 
Thomson (2000 cited in Akokpari 2005: 1) underlying iliese critiques is the 
negatiye effect ilie upsurge of neo~liberal globalisation has had on Africa, since 
"competition alld liiJeraliJation altCJ7ding ,globaliJation baJ'e onl]' preJeJJled Afiica )}Jitb 
j/frther dez'eiopmeJltal challen,~eJ. " 
Some auiliors have warned iliat these neo-liberal standards, which include 
parliamentary democracy and a primarily pri,oately-mvned press, should not 
merely be accepted without weighing flrsdy its rele,-ance and secondly 
in\Oestigating oilier options (Berger 1998:599 and Nyamnjoh 2005: 7). 
4.2.1 African Democraf)': The Pn'ori!J1 of Equi!J' and Del'eloplllellt 
Claude Ake argues iliat "political COJlditiollJ ill /1!n'ca are tbe greateJt impediment to 
dmloplllfllt" (Ake 1996:1). To support his argument he cites the mark left by the 
colonial legacy whose control over resoutces and indigenous people to a large 











of this form of colonial domination meant that ~\frica could not grow to reach 
its own hegemonic status. 
\Xl1en the move away from colonial domination did finally occur, the 
social economic, political and industrial infrastructures that would have enabled 
~\frica to operate independently were not de"cloped. To acti'Tly compete in an 
imbalanced world market fa,'ouring the colonial predecessors was and still is 
something £\frica is battling with. 
J\ke argues that a legacy of domination as forwarded under a colonial 
dispensation is one that was simply adopted by African leaders at the time. 
Finally, being bestowed with power is something that state leaders were not 
willing to gi,'e up - not even when ushered to do so by the populace. In order to 
maintain (pseudo) solidarity, the commitment to de"elopment was upheld as a 
common purpose that called for certain sacrifices. \Vith this, the new 
independent state leaders aimed to keep demands for redistribution of state 
resources and the structural transformation of the colonial economy under 
control (Ake 1996:8). It can be argued thus that the colonial forces prm"ided 
African leaders with a 'valid' excuse not to allow tl1e self-goyernance of its 
people, and in doing so development became the protagonist of democracy. 
Den:lopment and the accompanying dream of equity remain, to a large 
extent, an unobtainable reality and in many countries the reality is that both 
democracy and development is lacking due to the philosophy outlined in these 
paragraphs. \Xnat is needed, as advocated by "\ke, is a democracy informed by 
equity foremost, and then de,'elopment. The one should not be advanced at the 
detriment of the other. If this imbalance continues, this will result in what Ake 
terms the "democracy of alienation" (in Bradley 2005:407). 
1\lso it should be noted that the conception of democracy is one that 
differs widely in communities and countries. Bradley writes that democracy, 
(and this is true to all forms of governance to an extent) is a "configuration of 
gOI'ernallce moulded ~)' tlJe general llalues, biases, prejtldices and ntlallces of a y,il1en (ulture" 
(Bradley 2005:407). Whereas a common reflection and association with 
gm'ernance is achie,'Cd in a less di,'erse society like those charactetised in the 
\X'est, Bradley (ibid) notes that £\frican identity is intenvm'en ,vith "etlJnicif]', 
religion alld communal adaptations and traditions." \Vith many different cultural 
denominations sharing a common border,11 a homogenous definition of 











(sufficient' gm'ernance does simply not eXIst. \\/hcn Bradley (ibid) calls for a 
reappraisal of democracy in Africa he is correct in doing so. 
Just as the goals of modernisation, de\'elopment and communication 
should be adyanced in line with the social realities of the continent, democracy 
should be allowed to reflect an African character. This character according to 
"\ke and supporters is one that is already imbedded in traditional African political 
systems. The chieftain-system where accountability is rcstricted to a ward, society 
or community is a classic example of an existing, workable system that has been 
greatly eroded and replaced by \vestern prescribed models of gm'ernance12. 
To yiew African-style democracy from a different angle and not to 
become ent-'lngled in thesc Western models is important if socio-economic 
restrucrunng, (that would assist ill modernisation, de\'elopment and 
communication) is to take place. Bradlcy (2005:409) for instance cites Jalal (1995) 
who argues that a combination of socialism and democracy is perhaps better 
suited to tl1e African enyironmcnt where equal access to power and resources is 
more important than a liberal dispensation. 
To analyse African-style democracy in-deptl1 is beyond the scopc of this 
dissertation. 'Wnat is important to note in support of the theme is thc fact that, 
likc with the other m'erarching terms associated with tl1e dissertation's title, 
\X'estern critique aimed at de\'elopment and democrac\' in "\frica is flawed if 
social realities are not considered. 
That J\frica is communal rather than indiyidual-driyen is a \Try important 
factor. This communalism is not only important on a political front, since an 
understanding of imbedded practiccs like communal decision making also play 
an important role in communication practiccs and the dissemination of messages 
linked to de\·elopmcn t and social growth. 
4.2.2. Communication in Developing l""Tations: Tbe Great Diz'ide 
Although a critical approach to Western imposcd standards has been 
followed, it has to be stated that this criticism does not render thesc standards 
obsoletc. Howeycr, much has been said about the misintcrpretation of African 
realitics and tl1e associated misapplication of dcyclopment strategies. 
Understanding Africa is the key to effectiyc de\'elopment (Berger 1998:600). 
1, There are the exceptions, for example Botswana \-,y;unnjoh 2(l()3 cited in Bradb' 2005:412), 











This is a pertinent issue, since communication models can, and should not, 
merely be extrapolated from developed countries and applied to l\frican settings 
that are uniquely different from those of development partners. 
The majority of Sub-Saharan citizens are non-literate, poor and do not 
ha\'e technological resources at their disposal that will enable them to access 
modern mass media such as the internet, email and television. The media's 
impact is thus gready restricted. As Boafu (1986:41) writes: 
"Comtmmication and telecommunication D'stems ill most Afiicall coHntlies lar;g,ely 
sm'e tbe needs of tbe 25% ~f tbe people uJbo lizle ill tbe urball centres u'bile mglectin,g tbose 
75% JjJ!1O liJie in tbe 17Iral areas. Africa's C01J2lJJ1l17ication and telecommunications 
il~fimt17lcture is predominantlY marked ~)' bigb centralizatioll alld cOllcentration ill Ibe Jew 
urbanized areaJ, inadequate commullicationfacilz/ies and reJOllJYeJ and limited accessibili!y to 
al'ailablefacilities for mOJt people lil'Z'ng in tbe rural areas. " 
Berger (1998) underscores the dilemma of these 'c\frican realities' - of 
which the reach of the media seems to have the most limiting effect on 
development. Much media is still restricted to sen'1ng urban elites; where in the 
past it sen'ed the interests of the colonial power, it now sen'Cs the interests of an 
indigenous ruling group. He argues that because of the media's limited 
infrastructure in developing countries its political power is also compromised. 
,\ccording to Berger, the Western media is better prepared O\'erall to 
support democracy than de\'Cloping media. He identifies ke\' differences 
between what he refers to as ~\fOt1b or If'eJtem' and 'Soulb or Denloping' media. 
The differences are listed in the table below: 
TABLE 3: 
North or Western Media South or Developing Media 
Private ownership, comparatively Publicly owned, highly centralised, 
competitive, free, market-orientated system monopolised and controlled system 
(Ansah in Berger, 1998:603) 
High entertainment premium High educational function 
\\V'ell developed infrastructure Infrastructure is limited 
'New media' 'Old media' 
Largely public media Government controlled media 











The obvious and blatant differences between de\'cloping and de\'eloped 
nations are not restricted to mass communications. These disparities are applicable 
to most of the modern barometers identified supra. \'\'ithout much doubt, these 
disparities in turn playa restrictive role in de\-eloping nations mm-ing through 
the stages of growth proposed by Rostow (1979). If Sub-Saharan Africa is still 
wedged somewhere between traditional society and takeoff, how practical is it to 
apply and expect realities and ideals associated with countries that have already 
achieved the mass conswnption stage? 
A UNESCO conference in Windhoek ill 1991 em-isaged that the mass 
media should continue to play a cardinal part in the process of political 
liberalisation. Once again it was declared that an independent, pluralistic and free 
press was an essential component of the development and maintenance of 
democracy (Odhiambo 2002:295). 
Furthermore there are other international com'entions and declarations that 
presuppose that certain realities are present that are conducive to the conditions 
needed for liberal democracy. Article 19 of the International Convention on 
Cid and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations I)ide Resolution 2200£\ (Xt,(I) , provides, for example, "Ihat 
el'e/)'one shall hatle the right 10 Feedom ~f e:xpre.r.rioll; Ihis right shall include Ihe Feedom to 
.leek, receil'e and impart informalion and ideas of all kinds, rec~a,.dle.r.r o/Fonliers, either 
oral!)', ill wliting or in pn'nt, in liJe form 0/ art, or throl(~h til?), otiJer media of his cboice" 
(Odhiambo 2002:315). Freedom of expression has become a universal standard 
- but how legitimate is it to expect countries, especially de\Tloping ones, to 
adhere to these standards? 
Odhiambo poses the same question, although he casually states that 
measuring up to the same standard as any other nation "cosls Ilothing in matetial 
terlllJ." This dissertation disagrees with this statement, since ensuring a free 
media that caters for absolute equal access and receivable information does 
indeed seek capital and material imTstment. 
Every country needs an individual analysis, but Kenya can be referenced to 
illustrate the challenges that de\'eloping nations' face that ultimately hamper 












4.3 KENYA'S COMMUNICATION STA~Di\RDS A0JD CHALLENGES AS 
AN EXAi\fPLE 
Kenya is a signatory to the International Coyenant on Ci\il and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). This means that in local legislation the standards as expressed by 
the conyention should be incorporated. But this is not the case. Kenya's 
constitution does not proyide the same le\'el of acknowledgement to media 
freedoms as proyided in the ICCPR. 
Indiyidual freedoms do recei\'e protection under Section 79(1) and 
Section 79(2)(a) and (b) of Kenya's Constitution, but there is no specific 
reference to freedom of the media. This has resulted in many cases of media 
restriction and violations against media practitioners. This is worrisome in its 
own right, especially from the perspecti\Te of a libertarian press theory that \'iews 
these practices as undermining liberal democracy. The question that remains, 
howe\Ter, is whether constitutional and other political changes will make a 
difference if socio-economic realities remain unchanged. Diffusion of messages, 
whether political or developmental in character, cannot be achie\Td if there is 
limited consumption of media products. 
Odhiambo (2002:306) confirms that econorruc deyelopment and media 
de\'elopment are interlinked. 
He poses two important causal questions: 
1. How did the Ket!)'an eCOllotJ!)' petfOrlll ill tbe 1990 'J ill termJ of Jtmcture 
and c~r01JJth or decline? 
2. H01v ba.r itJ peifo17na17ce been rejlected ill tbe grou't/J and dil'enijicatioll of 
tbe media induJj~)'? 
Kenya, like its eastern "\frican partners, has shown little econorruc 
prosperity and this is reflected in the lewl of media ownership. 
Table 4 presents various indicators to show that economic growth in Kenya 
remains low. This is a clear indication that Kenya's national de\Tlopment strategies 
ha\'e been unsuccessful. Policies adopted and pursued by Kenya's gmTrnment 
during the 1960s were founded on the premise that economic prosperity would 
result in economic benefits trickling down to all Kenyans, even tl10se living in 
rural, traditional clusters. Nevertheless, according to the Global Monitoring 
Report (2007), pm'erty reduction and economic growth remain challenges 












Figures Uganda Tanzania Kenya 
% population 
li\;ng below 55% 51.1% 42% 
national 
pc)Yerty line 
GNP US$6.8 billion USS8.0 billion US$1O.6 billion 
Economical 




US$320 USS240 US$360 
GNP 
Gini Index 39.2 38.2 35.4 
The table retkcts figures dating back to the 1 <)<)(ls, in other words, during the so-called second wa\'e of 
democraC\'. Source: Compiled from Odhiambo (2()()2:306-307) 
A.nother rc!evant argument noted by Odhiambo (2002) is that expenditure 
on media products and communication gadgets come from disposable 
household incomes. Expenditure on media or information 'disseminators' is thus 
a luxury, which few can afford. Odhiambo (2002:307) refers to the use of ''per 
tapi/a /?,IYJUI/!J ill private conSNmption" to measure the availability of such funds. From 
1980 to 1998 the annual per capita growth in pri\-ate consumption in Kenya was 
0.2%, which means that Kenyans had close to 0% income to spend on 
communication gadgets and mass media products. Looking at the socio-
economic data presented in Table 5 indicate this remains a factor that should be 
considered in the 21 Sf century. In a study by the Institute for De\-c!opment 
Studies [Unit'ena! AmsJ to Communication Sem'ceJ ill rural Ket!)'a (2004)], findings 
showed that most Kenyans spend their meagre earnings on consumables such as 




Urban Population 19° ° 
Rural Population 81 °'0 
Hwnan Deyelopment Index 0.550 
CDI' USS3.9 billion 
GDP per capita 3.360 Kshs (approx. ZAR 0.43 or 
US S 0.04) 
GNP per capita 980S 
Human Pm'erty Index 34.1 
"\dult Literacy Index 0.736 
Source: Third J..:cnya Human DC\'c!opmcnt Rcport 2004, in Final Report to the Communications 











The study further found: 
• Ol'er 80% of the countlj"s population lilJeS in the 17Iral arem,-
• ll10St of tbe counto<, 17Iral population is engqged in sllbsistencefamlil{g,' 
• most Ken),ans spend tbeir earnings 011 cons1lmabies, mainl),/ood; 
• KelD'a'J J'otfth population (under 20years of age) accounts for 56% of tbe total and is 
di.rprop0l1ionall)' represented among tbe poor; 
• POZ'e11J' lez'els sbow a general increase; 
• edllcation JereL, are IJety low uitbjllst OI)er 55% of tbe bomebold bead, bating a prima~y 
Je/Joollel'el of education and anotber 18% bating no Jcbooling at aiL Tbose u;itb at least 
sfco!1dClJ)' scbool lel)el of edllcation compn"Jed a qUClJ1er of tbe bomebold beads. 
• The main sOllrce of information uJaJ tbe radio uJith a large mqjorilJ' (80%) of tbe 
bOIlJeboldJ relying on tbis medillm. lV'ord of mouth accolflltJjOr a mere 9%. 
• Tbe mqjonl)' ~f bOllseholds (76%) indicated tbat th~)' Jougbt illfomJCltioll 011 Jocial lifo. A 
mere 3% indicated tbat tb~)' seek infomtatioll 011 agn"{/{Itllre, altbollgb l710St reb' on 
subsisteJ1cejarming. Only 9% indicated tba! tb~)' seek il!fomlalion about politics. 
\v'hilst the level of poverty, cultural differentiation and communication 
structures differ in every African country, Sub-Saharan Africa is by and large a 
\'ast continent characterised by rural realities that su~gest it is largely in the 
beginning stages of development. Therefore data, like that prm"ided in the study 
outlined, should be incorporated in national communication policies. 
Based on the above data one can briefly su~gest that: 
• mral COJ1Jllllmicalion D'Jtem sbollid be a priOlilJj' 
• tbat agliCllltllral messages Jbollid be incOIporated in social programmeJ,-
• tbat tbe J'outb sbould be a main target,-
• tbat media sbollld be made more economical I)' accesJible,-
• tbat edllcation siJould receilJc much more attentioll and 
• tbat pJiOlitisation in communication policies to enable citizenJ to decipber media messages. 
Communication and development strategies that are 'contextualised' to fit 
into local settings are increasingly called for. Yet, it seems as if the importance of 
deycloping media, applicable across Yarious, if not all, sectors is not receiying the 











4.5 C01\L\1UNICATION ApPROACHES AND DEYELOP1\[E0JT 
STRATEGIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
1~uthors are quick to note and criticise the failure of 'imported Western 
dC\Tlopment ideologies' in Africa (Abrobvaa 1999:646), and further retaliate 
with suggestions that Africa should find approaches to de\'elopment that are 
more suited to its realities than Western models of modernisation ever were 
(ibid:664). Others point out that the Western path to de,oelopment is laden with 
ecological destruction as the "beliq( in tec/molog)' led, alld will increasingj)' lead, /0 
eco/~gical disasters)) (Sachs 1992 in Schuurman 2000: 1 0). The media in such a 
situation would be an accomplice in estranging indigenous peoples from their 
cultural roots as the media messages would urge them to adopt "the JJJron,g thi!Zf!,S 
for the JJ'rong reaSOJlJ with money thq)' did 110t haJ!e)) (Schuurman 2000:10). 
One of the main problems with Western models of modernisation is that 
the social system they suggested (an urban, modern system) clashed with the 
indigenous social systems that were (and still are) a core part of African 
operations. ~'hen development did not succeed, It was these traditional 
stlUctures that external observers blamed for stifling the process of 
modernisation. %en authors, like i\brokwaa (1999), sugg;est abandoning 
\X'estern development strategies in favour of i\frican-orientated ones, one can 
expect these African-orientated strategies to be more community driYen, rather 
than large-scale nationally enforced strategies as was attempted in pre\'ious 
deyelopment efforts. 
It is arguable whether Abrokwaa's suggestion (1999:664) that a total 
abandonment of Western development strategies is the answer to Africa's 
problems. NEPAD as an i\frican institution clearly does not support this 
suggestion either, as the organisation itself applies strategies of de,oelopment by 
the '\'Vest'. There is merit in a more i\frican-sensiti,'c approach, howe\Oer. 
Although the community (citizens) should in no manner be excluded from 
de\Tlopment policies, it is still a national, and with regard to NEPAD, a regional 
effort to bring about the desirable change. National and regional efforts at 
de,oelopment should howe\Tr be aware that change is not necessarily a top-down 
affair, and that increasing efforts should be made that deyclopment does trickle 
down to d10se community clusters that are a dominant part of ,~frica's demography. 
This also applies to communication sectors. Wnilst it is the lUra I areas that 











will haye a minimal impact if they are not integrated in national dewlopment, 
policies, plans and goals (also noted by Boafu 1986:36-37). Boafu (ibid) also 
notes that national communication policy, furthermore, has to be shaped by the 
socio-economic, cultural and political climate of societies. It is not unorthodox 
to suggest and respect that communication policies \\111 differ in e\'ery society. If 
a communication policy is deYeloped that is in line \vith the socio-economic, 
cultural and political realities, goyernments will be able to "safeguard its indigenolfs 
mltures agaimt the constant intrusion, through iI!formation channels, ~f undesirable alien 
cultural lJalues and trait.r" (Boafu 1986:38) . 
. \ conference on Communication Policies in Africa, held in Cameroon in 
1980, suggested a number of guidelines for communication policy of which three 
are applicable to this dissertation (in Boafu 1986:38-39): 
1. "Communication needs to be recognised as cHential to economic, social, education and 
mltural dezlelopment. 
2. Communication's ultimate goal should be tbe bette17Jlent ~f mall, 110t OIl!Y as an economic 
and social tlllit, but as a mltural entity and nitb the potentialfor conf1ibuti,Z2, in mal!)' 
wq)'s to the emicbment ~f tbe communi!]' of n'hieb be is pat1. To read) that potential, be 
needr to be injo17Jled and educated and gil 'Cll 0pp0/1Iml!)' to paJ1icipate ./idly in socio-
cultural actilities, including communication it.relf 
3. Such paJ1icipatioJl lIJould on!y be possible if he is protided nitb the JleceHat)'iacilities 
sucb as aeceJJ to communication media, tbe I7gbt to se!fe:':jJreJJion aJld tbe ligbt to 
make bis opinions knoll!J1. " 
E\'en though this was suggested In 1980, this remalnS relennt in the 21 st 
century where little progress has been made on the three points listed abow. 
4.6 J\fOVING AWAY FROJ\[ BRETTON WOODS: THEORETICAL 
SUGGESTIONS FOR AN AFRICAN SOLUTION 
The focus in Africa should moye away from mainstream media and should rather 
focus on community and small space media. ll1erefore, communication methods 
and meories should not be applied in a general fashion as done within the Bretton 
\X' oods School of Deye]opment Communication. McQuaiJ suggests: 
'Tbe functiom and c!!,oals of tbe preJJ IJlUst be seen di{ferfJItb" e.rpeeially around the 
jollowing tbemes: tbe pnmary of national dCl'elopmeJ1t tasks (economic, social, cllltural, and 











Jolidal7{y witb otber delJeloping COtlJltl7"es" (1994 cited 111 Ocitti 1999: 12). 
If Africa wants to move away from \V'cstern dominatcd de\!elopmcnt strategies, 
thc first obvious dcparture point would be to define the kcy concepts in thcir 
own tcrms. For example, how would ,\frica approach the topics of 
development, good governance and communication? 
Patrick Chabal (2002:452) writes that African political systems today are 
charactcriscd by three 'intriguing' characteristics: 'Tbq are illcreaJillgl;' informal, th~y 
appear to 're-traditionaliJe' and tb~y bal1e jailed to Jtimulate JIIJtained economic del'e/opJJJent." 
This is important to notc, since the approach to gm-ernance says 
something about the social constructions within Africa. 
Chabal's first characteristics highlight the relation bctwecn the indi\-idual 
and his/her community. In Africa, thc indi\-idual is far less autonomous than in 
the \\/est, as he/she is part of a collecti\-e. J\s Chabal (2002:452) notcs, 
"tbe indil'idllal cannot be conceived olitJide tbe coJJJJJJ/mi{y ji7Jm u;/)icb J(be) baiiJ, bouJclJer 
geograpbicallY diJtant J(be) may bejrom it. " 
This social construction intcrlinks with increasing calls for an 'Afl7·can 
RenaiJJallce' that enforccs African customs. Furthcnnore, Africans function 
simultaneously on sevcral diffcrent registers - from thc most ,-isibly 'modern' to 
the most ostensibly 'traditional' - in their evcryday li,-es (Chabal 2002:453). 
This in turns affccts political effectivencss. Thc African system combincs 
both traditional and modern modes of gm-ernance, cuhninating in a neo-
patrimonial system where the political clites or patrons (that on a vertical linc 
have achicvcd modernisation) servc their clicnts at thc same le\-el to ensure thcir 
position on the scale. The benefits of dC\Tlopmem would thus be restricted to 
,-cry fcw, as the benefits will only be extended sidcways to d10se operating on 
the same level. The few elites will bcncfIt, whilst the traditional masses cnjoy 
little deYClopment progress. 
The answer to this problem would be to cradicatc the differentiation 
between the horizontal and vertical distribution of de\-elopment. Thc way to do 
this would be to mobilisc thc traditional masses to challenge the neo-patrimonial 
order. Those who do not benefit, should be able to hold 'patrons' accountable 
without having to resort to violent mcasurcs. 
Communication systems can assist 111 d1is accountability and thc 
communication systems that are ad\-anced should bc sensitivc to the social-











In a study re\'iewing the role of mass media and interpersonal communication 
in deyelopment in Latin America, Africa and Asia, Rogers (1974:44) found that: 
1. ''/1t present, the mass media plq)' a major role in omtin/!, a climate for modemisation 
among tillagers, vut are less important in dfffusing teciJllological inllol'atiollJ - although 
tbeir potentia/for doing so z:r higb; 
2. tbat JJJaJJ media cbanJiCLr are more ~/lixtil'e u!ben combined witb intelpcrsonal cballlleLr, as 
in media forums; and 
3. tbat tbe traditional maJJ media, sucb as l>i1lage tbeatre alld tral'elling stOl)'tellers, bal'e an 
impOltant potentia/for dezlelopmen/ pllJposes, e.rpecialb' 1J'ben tb~)' are (()JJlvilled n7"tb tbe 
modem electronic and print media. " 
Rogers (1974:46) distinguishes between mass media and interpersonal 
channels by defining these concepts as follows: 
'~\1ass media channelJ are all those means of transmitting meJJ~geJ which illvolve a 
maJJ medium - sucb as JJeJJJ.rpapers, maga:dnes, film, radio and telel'isioJl - tbat ena/;/es one or 
Je7'eral illdilJiduals to reach all audience of maID'. Intelpersonal cballnels are tbose wbicb illvol7le 
a face-to/ace message transftr between tUIO or more indilidlfal.r lvbo JJlqy be famz!y memverJ, 
neigbbours alldfiiendr, sale.rpeople, sciJool teacbers, gOllCl71ment cbange agents or o/ben. " 
He continues to note that interpersonal communications are of greater 
importance for the diffusion of innoyations in less dewloped nations.1i 
Great emphasis has been placed on the call for a more African-sensitive 
approach to de\Tlopment. It is suggested that the necessary deyelopment can be 
achie\"ed with development models that are focussed on social as well as socio-
economic change without negating the importance of culture and imbedded 
social practices and realities. 
This idea together with the disillusionment with \'Vestern notions of a free 
media and its role in de\Tlopment has stimulated debates on alternative 
communication models. 
A study of 134 developing nations by Weayer, Buddenbaum and Fair 
(1985 in Ayish 1992:500), found that, "gillen the conditions ~fscarce resources, a colonial 
legacy', a poorfy edNcated population, tribal and etimic lil'ahies and a .w/Jordillate position i11 
fbe u'orld e(()noJJlic and il!formatioll Jy.rtelJl, a free press call too easzh' lead to all inability of 
g07'e17lmeJ7ts tojimction and to internal cbaOJ. " 
A.n example of an alternative approach to press freedom was suggested at 
a joint Asia-Pacific Press ComTntion and General Assembly of the 











Confederation of ASEAN Journalists, during which an 'Eastem model' of the 
press was presented as an alternative to the 1ve.lle17l model'. The alternative model 
featured a media-government partnership that was sensiti\'e towards goals of 
de\'elopment that worked alongside government in relation with the direction set 
by them. Since this type of model lends itself to serious gm'ernment 
inten'ention, this model will only be relevant and thus applied in societies where 
liberal democracy is not an intended outcome. Assuming that liberal democracy, 
whether present or not, is still an intended outcome, a goal or a core principle of 
a country's development policy, then the media should enjoy a fair level of 
freedom. The media does not have to be controlled to contribute towards 
government policies. 
If governments expect the media to contribute to development goals, then 
the intended outcome must be stated in government plans and policies. 
Mclkote (2003:137) prm;des an easily understood desired outcome to the 
African development process: "(I .lee) development as a prom.l tbat .lbouid prOlJide 
people UJz"th acce.l.l 10 appropriate and Jmlainable opporfunitieJ to imprOl·e their lilJeJ and lil)eJ 
of olben ill their communitieJ. !! 
Various approaches in order to achie\'e this change \,a communication 
systems ha\"C been advanced - most notably models that stress the importance 
of community driven media. 
Although this is the opposite of \V'estern models of communication, 
which relied on top-down approaches to achieyc de\'elopment, critics ha\'e 
noted that such models achieve little success if authorities retain control over 
messages and development agendas as "tbe pOJ/modemiJt deJtmclion ~r tbexe 
paJ1icipal0l), delJelopmenl paradigm.l aim.l to empower tbe people at graJJroot.l lelJel and to 
encourage 'real' Joczai change in indzi.zdual., and groupJ!! (l\ lelkote 2003: 138). 
Melkote (ibid) highlights two areas that may contribute to achie\;ng this 
goal: Participatory Action Research (Pl\R) and empowerment strategies. In the 
PAR model, the people identify key areas in need of awareness-making, and 
develop the methods to achieve this awareness; this identification is by collective 
and democratic means. The identified key areas are debated, which encourages 
participatory social action that are in touch with indigenous realities (ibid: 139). 
The model also includes and empowers indigenous knowledge that did not 










model, local narrati,"cs, popular knowledge, cultural mearungs and social 
arrangements are all incorporated to achieye maximum effecti,"encss. 
The second strategy, viz. empowerment, like the P/\R strategy, emphasises 
the need to give the power back to the local people, and to work with individuals 
and communities at the grassroots le,"el to enable them to participate 
meaningfully in the political and economic processes (ibid: 142). 
\'Vbereas \'Vestern-orientated paradigms minimised the power of societies, 
rendering them weak and non-existent to a certain extent, empowerment seeks to 
mobilise people to protect their interests by prmriding attainable channels to do so. 
\'Vbat should be emerging, thus, is a critical alternati,'e media, within which 
collecti,"e concerns, anxieties, goals and needs are addressed with debates and 
critical self-eyaluation. 
This form of 'small space' media, as opposed to mass media, remains the 
major form of communication in the majority of African countries. It is this that 
should be deYeloped and enhanced, since dC\'c!opment cannot be limited to the 
urban sections of societies that only comprise a minute section of populations. 
In Uganda, for example, the indigenous media has been utibzed as 
"a re.rpected, tJ71Jted and acceptable .101711 of del,e/opment colJllJlunication" (Mushengyezi 
2003:1(8). The deyelopment of small space media requires a mind shift 
from where communities arc assumed to be literate to the actual reality of a 
predominantly low literate population with ,'cry low lewis of technological 
development. 14 
Others like S.T. Kwame Boafo (1988) and Frank Ugboajah (1985) cited in 
\'(,'est & Fair (1993:93) proposed the term 'Oramedia' to highlight the 
importance of song, dance, drama, drumming, storytelbng, proyerbs and 
marketplace gossip as important tools for disseminating news and information in 
societies where de,"e1opment is lacking. 
\'Vbat seems to be emerging is an essentially culturalist paradigm that treats 
modernisation with a fair dose of ayersion. The irony is that the message, or 
goal, remains unchanged. Whilst culturalists adyocate the use of traditional or 
indigenous forms of communication like ritual theatre, 'to/king' drums, ,'illage 
criers, orators and storytelling, some have noted that although this will enhance 
the cffectiyeness of communication, the message, in essence, remains one that 
14 :'fushengyezi (2003:1UR) refers to a '~)ral-al(''' conununity and also notes that scholars haw pointed to a 











aims at adnncing modernisation (l\1ushengyezi 2003: 1 07 ~ 117 and \X' est & Fair 
1993:91 ~ 114). As a result, the '/!ybridization' of ideas is postulated as a solution in 
the struggle between tradition and modernity. In this hybrid system, indigenous 
and modern systems are incorporated to achie\T maximum effecti\Tness 
(l\1ushengyezi 2003: 115). 
Rogers (1974:49~50) supported this idea by pOin11ng our that the 
potential of communication in modernisation can be realised more fully when: 
1. ii/be maJS media are coupled uitb grollp diJcllJJioJl ill media/o17lmJ, and 
2. tbe traditional maH media, .wcb aJ balladeen and tral·elling I'illage tbeatre 
groupJ are utilized along witb fbe more modern electrollic alld pn'Jlf media. " 
Radio serves as a valuable example for this 'b),brid' system. In essence a 
'modern'medium, it has become a highly \'alued source of transmission all over 
1\frica. The number of radio handsets per 1000 people is significantly higher 
than other modern media forms such as newspapers, teleyision and the 
internet (Odhiambo 2002:3(8). In Kenya it is estimated that radio coverage is 
available to about 97°j{1 of the population (ibid:310). Its effectiveness to 
stimulate, aggravate and instigate \riolence was clearly illustrated with the 
Rwandan civil war, when the medium was used to promote dissent between 
ethnic groups. This illustrates that although literacy is not a prerequisite for 
recei\wg radio messages, political education is still needed in order to 
recognise messages that can be harmful. U sing radio together with traditional 
systems such as media forums increases its effecti\Tness. Rogers (1974:50) 
highlighted tlns relationship as an effectiye mode of transmission in 
de\Tloping countries such as Nigeria and Ghana. Media forums as further 
de\reloped in Canada consisted of an organised group of indi\riduals who meet 
regularly to receive a mass media programme and to discuss it afterwards (as 
explained in Rogers, ibid). 
This relationship is not limited to the radio, howeyer, but has been 
applied to the printed media and television broadcasts as well. These forums 
were shown to be generally effective in achie\wg beha\'ioural change by 
creating knowledge, forming, and changing attitudes. Critique bTlled by 
Schramm (1967 in Rogers 1974:51) at these media forums, howeyer, is tl1at 
continuous attention is needed from professional organisers; forum members 











these forums show great potential for maxlilllstng the effect of media 
messages. 
"\uthors, like West & Fair (1993:98) also warn against the politicisation of 
media and its messages. Some African governments are still controlling access to 
media and media production and remain reluctant to decentralise or democratise 
mass media. This cautious approach is often explained in terms of state loyalty 
and expressed fears that empowering local communities might work against 
national integration, since it might fuel ethnic conflict and 't,ibalism' (ibid). It is 
feared that this in turn will work against national development policies. 
Howe\'er, as West et al (1993) point out, radio messages can be rendered 
meaningless if it becomes clear that messages are gm'ernment driven, which 
might result in resistance towards accepting de\'elopment messages. 
Another form of media that has successfully combined the traditional and 
the modern is a form of theatre based on a 'Freireiall' methodology I 5. This form 
of theatre underscores the P~r\R strategy discussed abm'e, since it relies on 
messages constructed by the community. An arena of dialogue is established by 
including the subjects in the dramatic dialogue. The \'1ewers are drawn into the 
playas participants that have control over the direction of dle play by means of 
their suggestions and reactions (West & Fair 1993:1(2). Each indi\'1dual can thus 
send, recei\'e, contemplate and re-apply messages. It also assists in identif)mg 
griennces in local communities. Facilitators conduct intef\"iews during which 
contradictory \'1ews concerning local political structures and their role in 
mediating conflict and resolving local issues usually come to the fore. Village 
residents are also provided with the opportunity to \'oice their \'1sions for the 
future. ll1ese \'1ews arc then incorporated in a dramatic presentation that is 
perfonned at a public gathering. The ending remains open and, after the 
presentation, small groups of audience members are formed to discuss the 
problems addressed in the play, and to find resolutions to these problems. In 
dUs manner, the community itself finds ways to change certain social realities 
without feeling that ideas have been imposed on them. l (, 
The Freireian and PAR approaches to communication both rely hea\'1ly 
on collective or group participation. This contradicts the indi\'1dualist approach 
to communication informed by libertarian communication forms, which \'iew 
15 "-iamed after Paulo Freire who studied c\frican popular theatre. 











messages as information that should enable the indiyidual to make decisions 
best suited to him/her, as Huesca (Mody 2003:212) notes this form of 
communication "combines critical theo~J" Jilualion alla!pis and action, It'hich ill turn 
comtmctJ knowledge that IS examined, altered and expanded in practice. " 
Pluralism, modernism and indiyidualism, as de\Tloped by international 
communication processes denies the fact that in most i\frican societies 
"group relatiomhips are basic and group belonging iJ the on!y pOJJible wqy qr~iIJi~g meaning 
to indit.7·dual identitieJ" (Baraldi 2006:56). In the 'Freireian' and PAR approaches, 
participants are treated on a subject-subject basis, rather than on a subject-
object basis as found in the diffusion of innmTations approach. Melkote 
(Mody 2003:147) suggest that in these approaches "Ihe object qj communication 
profeJJionalJ Jhould be 10 empower people at graJJroots lel'el JO thai Ibl!J' call eliler and 
paJ1icipate meaning/it/h' in political and economic proceJJeJ in Iheir C01JllllllflZl)'. " 
This is very much in line with what Freire suggested in 1970. He 
denounced overtly Western guided approaches to de\Telopment communication 
and suggested an orientation during which "practitioJleI:f altempt 10 cloJe the ,gap 
between teacher and Jtudent, development agenl and cliellt, reJearcher alld reJearcbed, tbat 
would ullimate!y rCJult in a co-learning relatiomhip guided be ac!ion and reflection" 
(I--Iuesca 2003:212). 
\X/hat Freire in essence moved towards was a communication model that 
emphasised co-presence and inter-subjectiyity - emphasising dialogue between 
people (termed 'dialogic') that would by the construction of social reality 
between people lead to the hurnanisation of communication (ibid). 
I t makes sense that if this social reality is constructed between people 
then the deconstruction of tlus meaning can also take place within a 
community-centred approach. 
I t is fair to postulate tl1at if these grassroots approaches to communication 
are followed, then the reach of deyelopment messages will be higher, since a 
larger audience will be reached that will be able to interpret messages more 
easily. 
In Edeani's study (1980:73) it is shown that mass communication has 
the potential to influence all variables relennt to national deyclopment. 
These yariables were indicated to be: 
• Urbaniration 












• Political participation 
• Pre.rsfj'eedom 
Edeani (ibid) concludes that because of the potential influence of 
communication in development, gmTrnments should prioritise it when 
drawing up national development plans. 
The importance of communication in development is so well established 
that Edeani (1980) confidently notes: 'Tbe cmcial mle ql communication at botb tbe 
national aggregate and indil;idual If/Jeir of de71eloplllent bas been .lO cOll.li.ltCiltly demon.ltrated 
jivm .ltlldj' to .ltuely tbat reJearcberJ ballC now come to re,gard mode17liJatioll as a communication 
pmceJJ. II Rather disconcertingly, many "\frican governments do not give 
communication the necessary position of priority in national de,-elopment plans. 
Boafo (1986:43) underscores the importance of communication in 
devclopment plans and suggests that a national communication policy should 
be formulated in each African country, specifying measures, which would aim 
at the following: 
1. "Adapting botb impotted communication tecbnologie.l and traditiollalmedia to tbe 
pemliar de7!elopment needJ and goal.l and culturall.'alNeJ oftbe .locie!J',-
2. Ellcouraginc~ tbe gmwtb and del1elopment qf a more decmtrakred and participat01) 
colJJmlmication {YJtemJ ill tbe co1tnt~J''-
3. Effecting greater c~eogmpbical .rpread ZJl tbe dl~r!JibutiOJl of communication and 
telecommunication jacilitieJ,-
4. Generati/~~ a national recognition of il!jol7Jlation aJ a plime national reJource to be 
pmduccd, proceJJed, managed and dirtrillNtedfor tbe benefit ol tbe entire population,- and 
5. lvlaking communication .llrategie.l alld prom.le.l integral componentJ ql all .locio-
economic, political and mlluml dezJelopment proc~mmmeJ in tbe (0111111)'. II 
In order to achieve this, African states should acknowledge what is 
needed in terms of development. They should identify and define key areas in 
need of development, and should aim to achieye increased literacy leyels, 
better political social and economic education, increased agricultural output, 
better health and higher socio-economic standards. 
In addition, for future developments, "\frican gmTrnments should 
acknowledge technological ad,-ancements and help rural areas to gain access to 











SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 4 
The factors linked to this dissertation's theme namely: communication, democracy, 
dm/opmenl, mode17lisatioll all preside in a hierarchy of needs that is appropriately 
illustrated within l\1aslow's (1943) proposed hierarchy of needs. According to this 
hierarchy in which self actualisation and the will for deyelopment is the highest and 
final step in the sequential flow, physical needs such as health, food, water and 
freedom is the first step and highlights the basic needs that need to be addressed 
before the ad\'ancement can be made to the next step (safety). A great part of 1\frica 
still presides in Maslow's first physiological platform. The nced for safcty, group 
belonging, power and de\Tlopment all take second priority if the basic needs such as 
sanitation, education, running water, health-care and housing are not achieved. 
At the hand of this, it could bc argued that good gmunancc, thereforc, is also 
lower (or higher depending on how it is viewed) in the priority it cnjoys on the scale 
of unattained needs. The same can be argued for "modem" communication systems 
such as television and radio that is still considered a IlLxury as opposc to a necessity. 
Democracy, modernisation and proper communication has little meaning 
when a mother cannot feed her child. This is the reality of undcveloped nations 
were the masses are poor. Because this physiologicalle\TI still dominates the African 
continent, a practical revision and repositioning of modernisation in Africa should 
become thc focus. 
For this reason the last chapter recommends that commUnlcauon 
systems should be developed that firstly are sensiti\'e to the socio-economic 
factors faced by inhabitants of undcvelopcd, m'ertly traditional societies and 
secondly, that the messages portrayed in media should aim to address the 
needs faced by the receivcrs. This calls for localisation of the media: reshaping 
communication systems to address the most people, most effectively by means 
of participatory and community-based systems of communication. 
Suggestions by African scholars were also cited to illustrate how 
governments should outline and include communication in development 
policies. At all times it should be noted that although these pobcies should be 
included in national development plans, goyernments, as well as the 
international community, should always bc aware of rcgional differences within 
a state that might call for a diffcrent communication approach. Development 












£\lthough this dissertation concentrated on Sub-Saharan Africa, it has to be 
noted, that the e\"olution of the media, and the support it has been lending 
deyelopment policies in yarious African states, is at best, uneyen. Howe\"er, the 
general approach to the topic is substantiated by the fact that m"erall, Sub-Saharan 
~\frica is generally deprived of the socio-economic standards and priyileges that are 
experienced by fIrst world countries. To import communication efforts and ideals 
based on fIrst world expectations and realities on 1\frican soil will, as was 
illustrated at the hand of Kenya's socio-econornic realities, not ha\-e the intended 
de\-elopment outcomes due to gross disparities between media users and non-
users. These disparities where generally shown to be of geographical (17Iml versus 
urban), economic (ricb lJerJUS poor) political ([!,Ol'el7JJJJel1t interference l'ersUJ./i"ee media) and 
social (different Ctfltuml e:\:pectatioJlJ) nature. It was argued, that due to these realities, 
modernisation efforts incorporating communication structures as em-isaged by the 
Bretton \"\'oods School of Deyelopment Communication, had marginal success in 
achie\-ing deYelopment goals as forwarded by international agencies such as the 
IMF, WB, UNESCO and UNDP. 
These dnTlopment goals were presented as being within a triangular 
relationship where communication, development and gm-ernance operate within 
an influential sphere - e.g. changes in one was shown to ha\-e an effect on the 
other. This was substantiated at the hand of \-arious theorists, notably Lerner, 
Lipset, Rogers and Schramm who, during research, illustrated the influential 
relationship between effective communication and dn-e!opment on the one hand 
and democracy on the other. These theorists and theories inf01IDed the Bretton 
\\"oods School of Development Communication who applied this research in 
modernisation efforts aiming at decreasing the gap between traditional and 
industrial societies. Following a critical approach to this School's modus operandi, 
it was illustrated that modernisation efforts were flawed right from the onset of the 
process. Modernisation efforts were applied in a haphazard fashion: where initial 
political conditions were set for the successful application of deyelopment policies 
these conditions were rendered null and yoid when the em-isaged de\"elopment did 
not occur. This 'failure' was followed by SAPs that restructured political 











media. Both modernisation efforts, goyernance conditions and asswned 
communication structures proyed to be incompliant with African realities. 
In turn, it was suggested that de,oelopment policies in ,\frica should focus 
on the role its indigenous realities can play in the de,·elopmental process. Few 
suggestions were made In the closing subsections that deyelopment 
communication efforts should focus on an African-sensitiye media model that 
incorporate social realities in message distribution. In this model, it was suggested 
that communication rather be a bottom-up approach rather than the top-bottom 
approach that was followed by earlier, western prescribed, deyelopment efforts. 
This model would be of a more collecti,1.st nature, where participatory 
communications efforts are emphasised instead of indiyidual sender-receiyer 
models where the receiver is left to his/her own de,1.ces to decipher and 
implement media messages of a dC\·elopmental nature. An ,\ftican-sensiti"e model 
will also be more particularistic - whether cultural, geographical, socio-economic or 
political - since the needs and expectations between communities within a single 
state differ greatly. A single overhead development policy should therefore 
incorporate lenient structures that differentiate between different communities. 
The greatest shift that should occur is the realisation tl1at perhaps the 
biggest distinction that should be made between developed and de,oeloping 
nations such as Sub-Saharan Africa, is that where the rich is the group catered for 
in modern countries, it should be exactly the opposite in predominantly rural 
societies, where the masses are poor. Due to tl1e seemingly disregard for this 
reality, modernisation efforts, incorporating communication for de,oe!opment, has 
not reached its intended outcomes. 
The theory that communication can assist in deyelopment is not flawed, 
what is flawed is the method how this theory is applied. Key to de"elopment is 
'effectil'e' communication that is achieyed when local realities are taken into 
account. To achieye global development there should be a moye inward, 
guarding what is true to societies. 
Democracy might be an acceptable form of gm'ernance in the \X-'est but lack 
of definition and structure does not re"erberate true to cultural, collectiyist 
societies that dominate the African continent. 
To impose this form of goyernance, together with its liberal, capitalistic 











structure prm'"ides the operational skeleton for growth, 1S an insult to the 
differential yalues of the cultural structures in Africa. 
All societies do not necessarily seek democracy. They seek to be goyerned 
righteously by enjoying what is rightfully theirs: good health care, education, roads, 
running water, sanitation, and houses. Equity rather than liberation is what should 
be emphasised. In order to achieve a form of goyernance that re\Trberates true to 
"\frica's realities a reappraisal of democracy is needed. In all spheres it should be 
realised that Africa operates from a communal rather than indi\'"idual sphere. A 
mm'e towards a socialist-democratic combination was suggested, but it is 
important that this move does not prm'"ide totalitarian rulers with power to rule 
\\'"ithout considering the needs of the populace. De\'elopment should neyer be at 
the loss of equity. That Africa is communal rather than indi\'"idual is a \'ery 
important factor. This communalism is not only important on a political front, 
since an understanding of imbedded practises like communal decision making 
also play an important role in communication practices and the dissemination of 
messages linked to deyelopment and social growth. 
Socio-economic rights are not solely tied to democracy; d1ey are however 
tied to core hUITlL1.n needs that are often disregarded by totalitarian governments. 
These gm'ernments can be held in check through the exchange of news and 
ideas,l- but this wilful protest against a totalitarian leader is more often 
spearheaded when there is not appropriate deli\'ery of the people's needs. A 
democratic leader, therefore, can just as easily become embroiled in dissident 
\'oices when d1e government of the day does not deliyer in d1e basic physiological 
needs of its electorate. The link between communication and governance is most 
appropriately achieyed when effective communication methods are in place that 
enables the electorate to make their voices heard. 
The future of communications in Africa 1S interesting. Africa is 
awakening to technological advancements at a great pace; internet and cellular 
phones are fast becoming a reality among societies greatly oyerseen by the 
1VeJiem wires' of earlier telecommunication technology. 
1 c Geldof (2005:284) refers to a study "that has shown that \\,hen 2()O ° of a population has the ability to 
exchange news and ideas through access to cell phones and text messaging, dictatorial of totalitarian 











Bob Geldof (2005:282-283) surmise this reality most aptly: 
"Ajrica hm Jkipped the age of uJim that afforded the telecommtf1licatiollJ technology 
to the mt of the world. It haJ leapfrogged Jtraig/]! into the lvireleJJ era ... The UJe ~f mobileJ 
in Afiica Lr increaJing much jaJter than all)luJhere e/Je in the world ... It iJ happening elJen 
among the pOOl~ who will Jhare a Jingle phone between all entire COJJJlJ1Ullit)' ~f nCCCJJaI)'. " 
For societies only just fInding their feet in a post-modern world, traditional 
collectiye interaction, combined with Western technology will proof to be a 
hybrid of global realities that just might achieve what decades of prescribed 
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